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Passage of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982provides new op-
portunities for American business to organize and operate general trading
companies. Afterpresenting a thorough history and description of the Japa-
nese sogoshosha, Mr. Dziubla gives several compelling reasons for Ameri-
cans to establish export trading companies. He also examines the changes
in United States banking and antitrust laws that have resultedfrom passage
of the act, and offers suggestions for drafting guidelines, rules, and regula-
tions for the Export Trading Company Act.
For several years, American legislators and businessmen have
warned that if America is to balance its international trade-and in
particular offset the cost of importing billions of dollars worth of oil-
she must take concrete steps to increase her exporting capabilities., On
October 8, 1982, the United States took just such a step when President
Reagan signed into law the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,2
which provides for the development of international general trading
companies similar to the ones used so successfully by the Japanese.
The Japanese success in exporting goods is primarily a result of the
operation of a specific type of trading company, the sogoshosha, or gen-
* Awarded the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission/American Bar Foundation Fellowship in
Japanese Law, pursuant to which he is currently working toward an L L.M. in East Asian law at
the University of Washington in Seattle. B.A., 1974, Northwestern University; M.A., 1978, Uni-
versity of Chicago; J.D., 1980, Northwestern University.
I E.g., Cole, Establishing American Trading Companies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 277 (1980)
(excellent article providing a general overview of the Export Trading Company Act and Japanese
trading companies).
2 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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eral trading companies. While there are thousands of Japanese trading
companies, the vast majority of these are small- to medium-sized firms
specializing in a particular product or industry (senmonshosha).3 Only
nine out of these thousands, however, qualify as sogoshosha.4
The ability of the sogoshosha to export goods in enormous quanti-
ties and thus help Japan maintain a trade surplus is undeniable. The
Japanese overall trade surplus is expected to climb from $16 billion for
1981 to $20 billion in 1982, and its trade surplus with the United States
is expected to reach $15 or $16 billion, up from $9.91 billion.5
Former Senator Adlai Stevenson III, the chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on International Finance and formerly the primary pro-
ponent of the Export Trading Company Act, noted that in June 1980
the United States had a trade deficit of $2.28 billion, the fiftieth consec-
utive monthly trade deficit, and that the "success of trading companies
in exporting United States products has already been demonstrated by
foreign trading companies. Mitsui Trading Company is America's
sixth largest exporter."6
While this statistic is both impressive and disturbing, it neverthe-
less fails to convey the true enormity and marketing ability of the
sogoshosha. One revealing statistic is that in 1979 these nine compa-
nies accounted for 54.5% of Japan's imports and 48.2% of her exports.'
Further figures showing the size of the sogoshosha, the scope of their
activities, and their importance to manufacturers will be considered
below.
Two important questions face American businessmen and their
counsel as they consider the establishment of export trading companies.
First, why should American business go to the expense and trouble of
trying to establish general trading companies that could compete with
companies such as Mitsui or Mitsubishi when these same companies
are doing so well at exporting American products, for a commission of
only 2-3%? In other words, would it not 'be cheaper for American com-
panies to use the Japanese sogoshosha and pay their small commission,
or alternatively enter into joint ventures with them, rather than spend
millions of dollars to set up their own general trading company? Sec-
ond, if, as this article will demonstrate, there are compelling reasons
3 Y. TSURUMI & R. TSURUMI, SoGOSHOSHA: ENGINES OF EXPORT-BASED GROWTH 1 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as SOGOSHOSHA]; Cole, supra note 1, at 281.
4 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 1; Cole, supra note 1, at 281 n.22.
5 Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Nov. 23, 1981, at 2, col. 1.
6 126 CONG. REC. S1 1587 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1980) (Statement of Senator Stevenson).
7 Kanabayashi, Japan's Big and Evolving Trading Firms: Can the U.S. Use Something Like
7hem, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1980, at 58, col. 2.
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why America should establish general trading companies, then how
can American business develop general trading companies?
Six reasons compel American business to develop its own general
trading companies rather than to rely on the existing Japanese export
companies. First, although it will require enormous capital investment
to establish an American trading company that could compete with the
sogoshosha in an area where the sogoshosha have a definite experien-
tial advantage, an American general trading company would have only
one goal: to export American goods, particularly those manufactured
by small- to medium-sized firms, which have traditionally been sold
only within the United States. Thus, America's trade deficit would im-
prove. Moreover, because the trading companies would require an ex-
tensive network of international offices, they would presumably
provide many valuable jobs, particularly for liberal arts graduates and
especially for those with foreign language ability.8
Second, because the sogoshosha already are tied to their own-
largely Japanese-sources of supply of manufactured goods, they are
unable to give total commitment to exporting American goods.9 As
will be seen below, the sogoshosha have developed an integral network
of subsidiary and affiliated companies that provide component parts
and distribution services for finished goods ultimately exported by the
sogoshosha. Because all of these companies belong to a particular trad-
ing company group, because the core trading company has a financial
interest in seeing each of these companies prosper, and because the
trading company is often under a long-term obligation to purchase the
component parts from its affiliates, it cannot devote itself completely to
exporting American goods. Thus, it cannot devote itself wholeheart-
edly to its American customers, and exportation of American goods
would be of secondary concern at best.
8 The interaction of these American trading company personnel with the peoples of the world
would, in turn, presumably lead to a greater understanding of and appreciation for the foreign
and domestic policies of America's trading partners.
Congressman Paul Simon recently remarked on the dire need for foreign language training in
America. He stated further that the lack of trained personnel has greatly hurt the export activities
of many American companies. P. SIMON, THE TONGUE-TIED AMERICAN 1-40 (1980).
A recent article trenchantly notes that over 12,000 Japanese are currently studying in the
United States, with more than 50% of them studying technical subjects. The most popular subjects
are electrical engineering and computer science. In sad contrast, however, only 500 Americans are
currently studying in Japan, and most of these students are studying the arts or social sciences.
Shimn, Technical, Language Skills Give Japanese Edge Over U.S. Rivals, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
Oct. 26, 1981, at 15, col. 1.
9 SOGOSHOSArI, supra note 3, at 83. See also Abbott & Totman, "Black Ships" and Balance




Third, because the sogoshosha are already in fierce competition
with each other and beset by internal and external problems that will
be discussed more fully below, they probably cannot be induced to un-
dertake the additional problem of developing separate joint ventures
with nascent American trading companies,10 especially when the
American trading companies eventually could produce the strongest
threat to the hegemony of the Japanese trading companies within the
field of international trade.
Fourth, the overwhelming preoccupation of sogoshosha personnel
with sales volume, which is a necessary evil given the low commission
rates which the sogoshosha charge, has rendered them insensitive to the
needs of small- and medium-sized firms." Although the sogoshosha
have had long experience exporting the goods manufactured by small-
and medium-sized Japanese companies and thus have learned how to
handle the concerns of such customers, the sogoshosha have limited
experience with American manufacturers of comparable size. There-
fore, they would be likely to ignore the needs of their American cus-
tomers in order to maintain sales and, thus, profit levels.
Fifth, a United States general trading company would be best
suited for barter trade. As one author has stated in concrete terms eas-
ily appreciated:
In dealing with China, American manufacturing firms will soon dis-
cover that China's ability to balance her imports through barter-trade ex-
ports will require sogoshoshalike internal exchanges of diverse
commodities and services. How else can American manufacturers who
want to export tractors receive payment in kind in the form of Chinese
apparel and sorghum-based "white lightning" called Mao-tai? 2
In short, American trading companies would be an important means of
establishing mutually beneficial trade relations with many third world
nations that are short on foreign exchange reserves.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, American trading compa-
nies would presumably be very profitable. In 1971, the average return
on equity achieved by the Japanese trading companies was 27%.13
American trading companies should be able to achieve similar returns.
For the foregoing reasons, American business should take advan-
tage of the opportunity to form general trading companies provided by
the Export Trading Company Act. Many Japanese executives, how-
10 SOGOsHosHA, supra note 3, at 83.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 74.
13 See M. YOSHINo, NOTE ON THE JAPANESE TRADING COMPANY 15 (1973) (Harvard Busi-
ness School Case No. 9-374-136); see also infra text accompanying note 210.
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ever, question the ability of American business to develop international
trading companies. This is because long-term investment in both capi-
tal and personnel is required. As Akio Morita, chairman of Sony, Inc.,
remarked in 1973:
A member of our company may be stationed in some faroff land, strug-
gling to learn in a country with entirely different customs and characteris-
tics. But he realizes that with the knowledge he has gained in five years or
so he might become chief of the department in our head office that deals
with this area. . . .He, therefore, is keenly interested in how strong the
company will be in five or ten years from now. . . .As a result, Japanese
enterprises steadily move ahead. . . American companies are con-
stantly concerned with figures, and if rapid returns are not produced, the
rating of the company drops. Except for very large corporations there-
fore, I wonder whether American companies are willing to embark on
worldwide marketing ventures that require long term investments. 4
Similarly, the managing director of Marubeni Corp., the third largest
sogoshosha, commented that "[i]t would be very difficult for the U.S. to
establish trading firms like those in Japan because Japanese firms are
based on Japan's unique industrial structure."' 15
What is this "unique industrial structure" and, assuming that it
provides the basis for the Japanese success in forming export trading
companies, how can America develop successful trading companies
within the context of its own business and industrial structure? The
remainder of this article attempts to answer this question. Only one
previous article has even addressed this question, 6 but given the nov-
elty of the Export Trading Company Act and the dearth of information
on the sogoshosha, several questions remain unanswered.
For example, will the modifications of United States antitrust laws
by the Export Trading Company Act provide American trading com-
panies with immunity from antitrust laws comparable to that enjoyed
by their Japanese counterparts? Will the modifications of United
States banking laws permit United States banks to become as
financially involved with their client trading companies as is possible
for Japanese banks under the Japanese banking laws and system? Why
did the sogoshosha develop in Japan over 100 years ago while the same
concept is only now beginning to arouse interest in the United States?
Can this 100-year gap in experience be closed, and, if so, what form
will American trading companies assume?
In attempting to answer these and related questions, this article
first defines general trading companies and establishes a framework for
14 Quoted in Y. TSURUMI, JAPANESE BUSINESS 4 (1978).
15 Kanabayashi, supra note 7, at 56, col. 2.




analyzing them. This framework is simply a statement of the three cru-
cial functions that all trading companies must perform to be successful.
Then a review of the pre-World War II development of the sogoshosha
within this framework shows how the Japanese social and legal struc-
tures provided the basis for the phenomenal growth of the sogoshosha.
Incidentally, this review may also provide a preview of the possible
stages of development facing American trading companies.
The next section of this article describes the postwar development
of the sogoshosha and their current functions. Included in this section
are discussions of the Japanese antitrust laws and how they affect
sogoshosha operations; the financial structure of the sogoshosha; the
degree of intercorporate ownership and interlock which prevails; and
the fundamental role that large commercial banks fulfill by making
enormous low-cost loans to the sogoshosha and by owning significant
percentages of their stock. The section then concludes with an analysis
of the changes adopted by the sogoshosha within the past eight years in
order to cope with significant developments in international investment
and trade.
The last section of this article examines the modifications of
United States banking and antitrust laws that have resulted from pas-
sage of the Export Trading Company Act. It compares the American
and Japanese laws to determine if American trading companies will
have the same freedom and flexibility of operation as their Japanese
models.
In conclusion, this article offers suggestions for the drafting of
guidelines, rules, and regulations for the Export Trading Company Act
and describes the most likely course that American businesses-espe-
cially American multinational banks-may follow in creating their
own trading companies under the new Act.
I. INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES: WHAT ARE THEY AND
How Do THEY MAKE ALL THAT MONEY?
A general trading company is an economic organization whose
functions are:
1. to minimize the risks involved in international transactions (the
risks of fluctuation in demand and fluctuation in exchange rates) by
spreading these risks over many transactions and many customers;
2. to reduce transaction costs by taking advantage of economies of
scale; and
3. to make efficient use of capital because of the preceding two
Northwestern Journal of
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functions. 17
A sampling of the descriptions of the sogoshosha provided by other
scholars may help expand and explain this proposed definition and an-
alytical framework.
One author has attempted to describe the essence of the
sogoshosha by declaring that "its ability to bring about synergistic im-
pact is the success secret of trading companies.""' Another has de-
scribed the sogoshosha as "market intermediaries for the domestic and
international distribution of Japanese manufacturing firms."19 A third
scholar has focused on the integrative function of trading companies
within groups of corporations: 2° the trading company taps the financial
resources of the group bank and acts as the purchasing and sales agent
for all of the group's manufacturing enterprises.2 ' A recent work has
described the sogoshosha as "primarily large-volume, first-stage whole-
sale traders of industrial raw materials and grains and of such stan-
dardized intermediate products as steel, synthetic fiber, and
fertilizer. '22 One of the most thorough scholars in the area of Japanese
multinational business operations, Michael Yoshino, believes that the
17 Yamamura, General Trading Companies in Japan: Their Origins and Growth, in JAPANESE
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 165 (H. Patrick ed. 1976).
Two other authors have tried to define what the sogoshosha are by proffering a profile of their
fundamental activities. One writer states that the "vital functions" provided by the sogoshosha
are: (I) territorial knowledge of both domestic and international markets; (2) dynamic and static
economies of scale; (3) a large internal market, that is, the ability to barter goods and services
within the sogoshosha itself because of the huge number of goods and services handled; and (4) fi-
nancing services using capital from the international capital markets. SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3,
at 11-14.
Another author states that the main strengths of the sogoshosha are: (1) group affiliations
revolving around the central trading company and including various manufacturing firms, (2) an
international information network, (3) excellence in management, and (4) financial services. M.
YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 11-12.
Both of these authors have overlooked the central role that the large Japanese commercial
banks have played in the growth of the sogoshosha. For a description and analysis of these "bank-
centered conglomerates," see infra text accompanying notes 218-236.
18 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 6.
19 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 5.
20 Throughout its history Japan has been noted for the importance of groups. In the business
world, this national characteristic is demonstrated by the common practice of corporations group-
ing around a large commercial bank. For more information, see infra text accompanying notes
218-236.
21 M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 6-7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JA-
PAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES].
22 A. YOUNG, THE SOGO SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES 6 (1979).
Mr. Young further states that price, speed of information, and economies of scale "are of primary
importance in these kinds of sales, which require little engineering service to manufacturers, mini-
mum sales promotion, and minimal repair and other after-service to retail customers." Id. Each
of the sogoshosha handle between 10,000 and 20,000 products. Id. at 4.
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true strength of the sogoshosha lies in their ability to coordinate the
activities of small, independent manufacturing firms so that these firms
complement each other's skills in performing a variety of specialized
manufacturing and distributing functions.2 3 One example of the suc-
cessful sogoshosha operations that he provides is the synthetic fibers
field. This example will help illustrate the previously proposed defini-
tion by providing a concrete explanation of the contribution of the
sogoshosha to the development of successful export trade.
The two firms that pioneered synthetic fibers had many problems
marketing their new products, and one of the main obstacles was the
reluctance of the spinning, weaving, dyeing, and manufacturing firms
to use the synthetic fibers. Most of these firms were small and family-
owned. Their reluctance was understandable because they were unsure
of market response and lacked technical expertise. To overcome this
reluctance, the synthetic fiber manufacturers organized a select group
of the small firms into a hierarchical manufacturing system and pro-
vided technical and managerial expertise. The trading companies took
over the movement of the goods among these firms and provided credit
at every stage. Finally, with the help of the trading companies, the
fiber manufacturers developed a hierarchical system among fiber
wholesalers and distributors. The result was vertical integration from
the manufacturer through processing firms to retail outlets.24
. The trading companies also gave export advice to the fiber manu-
facturers. When import restrictions abroad began threatening the ex-
port position, the trading companies were the first to perceive this
threat because they were the export agents. The trading companies
then put together a hierarchical organization abroad by convincing and
helping the small manufacturers-who had hesitated to locate abroad
by themselves-to set up foreign subsidiaries. Generally, the fiber
manufacturer held 20-30% of the equity in the foreign subsidiary. The
trading company held 15-25%, other firms in the group held 5-10%, and
the remainder was locally owned.25 These foreign subsidiaries then be-
came captive outlets for the export of intermediate materials. This
method succeeded because the import restrictions were imposed on
goods in the final stages of production-spun, woven, or completed
manufactured goods-rather than the fibers themselves. By exporting
fibers to their subsidiaries and manufacturing the restricted goods in
the foreign country, the manufacturers avoided all or most of the im-
23 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 69.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 70.
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port restrictions.26
The fiber manufacturers provide a concrete example of how the
activities of the sogoshosha can help to solve the export problems of a
particular industry. It is now necessary to examine how these activities
fit into the three-part analytical framework proposed at the beginning
of this section.
A. Minimizing the Risks of International Trade
One of the three functions of the sogoshosha is to minimize the
risks inherent in international trade. These risks fall into two catego-
ries: fluctuation in exchange rates and fluctuation in demand.
The sogoshosha minimize the risks that result from fluctuations in
exchange rates by importing and exporting simultaneously. Thus, they
are able to buy and sell in local currencies. This, according to at least
one author, reduces transactions across different currencies to "a frac-
tion of the total import and export business."2 7 For example, a trading
company will make a commitment to buy goods from a Japanese pro-
ducer in yen, even though the export sales contract is in dollars. Al-
though the trading company might thus absorb a foreign exchange loss
for its customer, it can internally offset this exchange loss against an
exchange gain resulting from the purchase of goods in America in dol-
lars and the sale in Japan in yen.28
Another benefit accruing to the trading companies because of their
dealing in several currencies is the ability to speculate in the foreign
exchange markets. Because the sogoshosha have large supplies of
many foreign currencies on hand to finance their various projects, they
are able to sell at a profit--or at least avoid a loss--on a currency that
is about to decline in value vis-;I-vis other currencies that the
sogoshosha possess. Thus, when the sogoshosha expect the American
dollar, for example, to decline in value against the Deutschmark, the
sogoshosha will sell their dollars for Deutschmarks. The trading com-
panies are particularly well suited to benefit from trading in the foreign
26 Id.
27 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 163-66. Another author, however, contends that the trading
companies are able to "marry" their exchange transactions only about 15% to 25% of the time.
The reason, he explains, is that "[t]he tendency for import payments to be short-term and export
receipts to be medium to long-term results in a lower ratio of 'marriages' than would be possible if
export receipts and import payments were more in phase." W. MONROE, JAPAN: FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 51 (1973). He goes on to remark that the trading compa-
nies are both the major customers of the authorized foreign exchange banks and the major de
facto foreign exchange dealers for the majority of Japanese firms. Id.
28 Krause & Sekiguchi, Japan and the World Economy, in AsiA's NEW GIANT: HOW THE




exchange markets because of their vast international intelligence net-
works that often provide advance knowledge of political and economic
changes affecting international exchange rates.29
The sogoshosha minimize the risk of fluctuation in demand pri-
marily through their ability to spread this risk over many transactions
and many customers. Although no concrete data exist on the number
of sogoshosha transactions or customers, each of the sogoshosha han-
dles 10,000 to 20,000 different products.30 The number of individual
transactions would obviously be much higher.
The sogoshosha also reduce fluctuations in demand through their
unique ability to create long-term supply and demand, to ensure long-
term stability in supplies of products and materials, and to generate
new business. The sogoshosha create supply and demand by organiz-
ing huge joint ventures, such as overseas development of industrial raw
materials like iron ore, coal, or bauxite, with giant producers. On the
one hand, these ventures supply raw materials which the sogoshosha
can sell 31 and, on the other hand, they create demand for transporta-
tion, construction, and mining equipment. Naturally, the sogoshosha
are willing to provide such equipment, either as principals or agents.
B. Economies of Scale
The second function of the sogoshosha is to take advantage of
economies of scale. Although trading companies effect economies of
scale in numerous areas, the most significant one is the development
and transmission of market information.
The production of information about market opportunities in-
cludes the costs of gathering and disseminating such information.
These costs, however, are fixed and independent of the use to which the
information is put. Thus, the key to lowering the costs is to increase the
size of the market for such information.32 The costs of assembling this
information are distributed among its users. Nonetheless, as a whole
these costs are staggering. For example, in 1973 Mitsui spent 3,000
million yen (about $13,333,333) on information and communications,
and 2,000 million of this amount (about $8,888,888) was spent on tele-
communications alone.33 It is this magnitude of expenditure that
29 Id.
30 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 4.
31 Id. at 3-4.
32 This is true because the "search costs per unit of information" decline as the market ex-
pands. Yamamura, supra note 17, at 164.
33 H. FUKUDA, JAPAN AND WORLD TRADE: THE YEARS AHEAD 68 (1973). The dollar figures
are based upon a July 1981 exchange rate of 225 yen to one dollar.
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makes Mitsui's communications system second only to the
Pentagon's.34
Within the realm of market information, the sogoshosha "thrive
on both dynamic and static economies of scale."35 The static econo-
mies of scale derive from their domestic and worldwide network of
market contacts. Once the initial investment in large-scale informa-
tional networks is made, the incremental costs of processing territorial
information are marginal to the trading companies and their clients.
The sogoshosha's average general selling and administrative expense is
very low-about 1.3% of revenues. By contrast, in small enterprises
this figure can be as high as 25%.36 Hence, even small- and medium-
sized firms, in Japan or abroad, which often are too weak financially
and managerially to have any market contact points, can simply hook
up with the vast informational network of a sogoshosha for a small fee.
This fee covers only the incremental costs and incremental contribu-
tions to the sogoshosha's overhead. Often even large firms use the
sogoshosha's information and distribution networks for developing un-
certain markets and for servicing existing but inaccessible markets.37
The dynamic economies of scale enjoyed by the sogoshosha derive
from the cumulative ability of both the organization and its individual
employees to identify, screen, process, and translate into business op-
portunities the political, economic, social, and even climatic events oc-
curring within domestic and international markets.3" This ability stems
from what one author has termed "the process of learning by doing
that takes place inside sogoshosha."39 According to this author, the ac-
cumulated experience of a sogoshosha's past successes and failures is
passed on to its recruits, who join the trading company's internal efforts
to increase the firm's "informational stock."'  This information in turn
reduces negotiation costs because buyers and sellers are aware of their
alternatives-they have greater certainty about the world price struc-
ture and their own opportunity CoStS. 4 1
While the range of information supplied by the sogoshosha is as
34 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 77-79. During fiscal year 1976, the top six sogoshosha spent
about $192 million on expenditures related to information and communication. Id. at 77.
35 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 12.
36 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 16.
37 Id.
38 SoGosHosHA, supra note 3, at 12.
39 Id. Stated another way, this specialization of trading company personnel in international
trade results in savings because specialization, and the resultant increase in productivity, is a func-
tion of the volume of transactions. Yamamura, supra note 17, at 165.
40 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 12.
41 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 164.
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broad and diverse as the needs of their clients, there are fairly standard
areas covered by all the firms. These areas include: size of potential
markets; competitive manufacturers in the export country; current
prices and profit potential; foreign exchange rates and likely financial
fluctuations; distribution channels; the credit ratings of potential whole-
sale and retail distributors; current attitudes of industrial users, con-
sumers, competitors, labor unions, or government officials toward the
proposed export products; foreign import regulations and other tariff
and nontariff trade barriers; and the various export permits required by
the government.4 2 For those manufacturers dependent upon advanced
technology, the sogoshosha provide information on current scientific
and technological advances in the United States and Western Europe,
on the latest equipment available, on market potential, and on technol-
ogy licensing or joint venture requirements.43
The sogoshosha also benefit from economies of scale in the areas
of transportation, warehousing, and insurance. Because the sogoshosha
handle diverse goods, and more importantly, at diverse locations, they
are able to charter an entire freighter, aircraft, train, barge, or other
mode of transportation and fill it by consolidating the goods supplied
by many clients.44 In this way, the sogoshosha do not have to pay a
premium for guaranteed, timely shipment of a cargo. Moreover, even
if they do not charter an entire vehicle, they can negotiate bulk dis-
counts for volume shipping. Finally, the sogoshosha can obtain
favorable shipping rates from carriers with excess capacity because the
sogoshosha can guarantee return business.45 The trading companies
also receive beneficial rates on insurance and warehousing because
they can guarantee a high volume of transactions. Indeed, many
sogoshosha find it profitable to own their own shipping, warehouse,
and insurance companies.46
42 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 61.
43 Id.
44 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 13.
45 Id. at 13.
46 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 66. Mr. Young notes that:
The big trading companies own many warehousing subsidiaries, including rolled steel ware-
houses, grain elevators, and refrigerated warehouses. They also own large ore carriers, log
carriers, and general cargo ships. Firms such as Nippon Kokan K. K., Nisshin Flour Milling
Co., and Sapporo Breweries, Ltd., to use the Fuyo group as an illustration, can often employ
group railways such as Keihin Electric Express Railway Co., or Tobu Railway Co., Marubeni
Corporation warehouses such as Marubeni Reizo K. K. at the Tokyo harbor, and Marubeni-
owned cargo boats or transports operated by group member Showa Shipping Company.
Id.
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C. Efficient Use of Capital
The third and last major function of the sogoshosha is to make the
most efficient use of capital possible; their ability to accomplish this is
based upon their success at reducing risks and effecting economies of
scale. Simply stated, "[b]y reducing risks (that is, reducing the variance
of expected returns) in using capital, the trading companies are able to
obtain capital (and create credit) which would not have been available
to a single trader, or available only at a higher price."' 47 Furthermore,
because the economies of scale described above substantially reduce
the costs to the customers of the sogoshosha, the amount of capital em-
ployed by the customers is increased substantially.48 That is, because
the sogoshosha can extend credit and long-term financing and because
they can provide export services at the lowest cost, they reduce their
clients' costs. The money saved is capital, which otherwise would have
been unavailable. Even larger manufacturers "would have to allocate
a substantial amount of capital to provide or purchase these services
independently at a higher cost."'49 Japanese industry benefited greatly
from exactly this type of increased available capital during the boom
times of the 1960s and 1970s when capital was scarce.50
The foregoing analysis of how the sogoshosha export competitively
and yet make a substantial profit should provide the reader with an
understanding of the essential functions and operations of the
sogoshosha. It should also provide a basis for understanding how
American business-within both the industrial and service sectors of
the economy-could benefit from the formation of American trading
companies. Yet the foregoing description inadequately details the in-
tricacies of international trade as practiced by the sogoshosha and the
close, intergroup coordination and interdependence that are crucial to
the sogoshosha's success.
The following description of the historical development of the
sogoshosha is intended to fill these gaps. At the same time, the descrip-
tion provides an insight into the role that various historical occurrences
and accidents played in the evolution of the sogoshosha. It should also
give the reader the means to assess the possibility and the methods for
development of American trading companies.
47 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 165.
48 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 67.




II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SOGOSHOSHA
The modern day sogoshosha evolved from two different sources.
The first was in the Japanese trading and banking houses that began to
expand so rapidly during the 1870s and 1880s and that ultimately were
calledzaibatsu.s5 The course of this expansion was largely vertical and
involved expansion from trading and banking into manufacturing ac-
tivities. The predominant examples are the Mitsui and Mitsubishi fam-
ilies, 2 followed by Sumitomo and Yasuda.
The zaibatsu, defined as a "group of giant diversified companies
under the control of a family-owned holding company," 53 sprang up at
this time primarily for two reasons. First, in the 1880s the Japanese
government decided to dispose of most of the commercial enterprises it
had begun and run under government control since Commodore Perry
had opened Japan to the West, and it was the zaibatsu that acquired
most of these operations.54 Second, during the 1880s, the zaibatsu
adopted the radical Western notion of the joint stock company.55
Thus, the zaibatsu were able to expand their supply of capital by selling
their stock publicly.
The owners of the zaibatsu, having imposed a corporate form on
their multifaceted operations, controlled their empires in the following
manner. First, they established a holding company at the pinnacle of
their corporate pyramids. 56 They then segregated their various com-
mercial operations into corporate subsidiaries and affiliates. These
were linked together in an extensive network by means of intercorpo-
rate stockholding, interlocking directorates, management agents, and
easily available bank credit, which the zaibatsu extended to their affili-
ates to facilitate the expansion of their production and to increase their
dependence upon the zaibatsu.57 One author has remarked that the
zaibatsu were patterned closely after the Japanese concept of the fam-
ily: a network of related households, all of whose members were sub-
ject to the authority of a single head.5"
It was at this point that the trading companies as we know them
51 Y. TsURUMI, THE JAPANESE ARE COMING: A MULTINATIONAL INTERACTION OF FIRMS
AND POLITICS 132-35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as THE JAPANESE ARE COMING]; M. YOSHINO,
supra note 13, at 2.
52 J. ROBERTS, MITSUI: THREE CENTURIES OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 4-5, 119-20 (1973).
53 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 4.
54 Id. at 4-5.
55 Id. at 5. This type of company is called kabushiki kaisha, and the initials K.K. are often
placed after a joint stock company's formal name.
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today began to appear. They sprang up because the zaibatsu lacked an
integrative element, that is, a central organization within the zaibatsu to
coordinate production and intergroup transportation of component
parts and finished goods, and to arrange financing.5 9 By tapping the
financial resources of the group bank, utilizing the existing shipping
and warehousing arms of the group, and serving as the purchasing and
sales agent for all of the group's manufacturing enterprises, the trading
company was able to coordinate and integrate all of the various activi-
ties carried on by the diverse companies under the control of the
zaibatsu.6 ° The trading company provided essential links within the
zaibatsu by skillfully organizing a large number of small enterprises to
produce for the export market.6 This relationship between the trading
company and the smaller affiliated firms was called keiretsu.62 The
trading company would supply its keiretsu firms with raw materials,
technical and management assistance, and credit.6 3 Moreover, it was
the trading company that allocated the credit of the zaibatsu.4
The second source from which the sogoshosha evolved was the
senmonshosha, or the small- to medium-sized trading companies spe-
cializing in one product or industry.65 Some of these senmonshosha
have their origins in the textile industry and date from the late 1880s,
when the cotton spinning industry developed in Japan. The necessity
of procuring raw cotton from foreign sources gave rise to specialized
trading companies in that field.66 Then, as the cotton spinning industry
became large enough to export, the trading companies that had special-
ized in cotton procurement abroad began to handle the exports as
well.67 Gradually, they diversified into other products and industries
because of their experience in the cotton industry.
The sogoshosha grew rapidly during the period from 1900 to 1945.
By the turn of the twentieth century they had established an extensive
network of branches and offices in every major market in the world.68
Through this network the trading companies exported cheap, labor-in-
59 Id. at 6-7.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 7.
62 Kei means "lineage" and "group," while retsu means "arranged" in order. Thus, keiretsu
means an organization that is well-ordered. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 2; THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 132-35.
66 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 3.
67 Id. C. Itoh and Marubeni developed in this way. Nisho-Iwai and Ataka developed in a
similar fashion, but within the steel industry. Id.
68 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 7.
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tensive, highly-standardized products that were distributed in a foreign
market by local wholesalers and retailers.69 The role of the trading
company in exporting these cheap, standardized products was quite
simple: "neither technical services nor advertising and sales promotion
was required. Of overriding importance for trading in these products
was the simple communication of information on price and volume." 70
In addition to functioning as an export conduit, these distribution net-
works abroad served another purpose by identifying new technology
and products and feeding them back to the main company.s
As the sogoshosha gained more experience in international trade,
their internal structure became more refined. During the early 1900s, a
trading company was a unified operation in which all employees han-
dled all types of trading. But, as time passed, the trading company
divided along major product lines.72 A concomitant change in manage-
ment style also occurred: managers were sent abroad for long periods
of time, and division managers and heads of foreign branches were
given considerable autonomy.73 The means by which these foreign-
based managers were controlled, however, remained traditional. They
were bound by a long-socialized and deeply engrained sense of loyalty
to the honsha, the main company, which in most cases was the holding
company at the top of the zaibatsu pyramid.74 Moreover, their loyalty
was rewarded because ultimately they were promoted back into the
honsha.
Two questions remain to be answered before this historical analy-
sis will be complete: why was it that general trading companies devel-
oped in Japan during this period and did not develop elsewhere, and
why did certain trading companies develop into sogoshosha while
others did not? The answers to these questions may provide helpful
insights for Americans contemplating following the Japanese model.
In trying to answer the first question, it is important to note at the
outset that Japan is tragically poor in natural resources, and it is this
characteristic which most influences Japan's economic relations with
other nations.75 This scarcity of natural resources provided a strong
impetus to engage in international trade. Furthermore, because the
Japanese government was determined to avoid the economic domina-
69 Id. at 8.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 7.
72 Id. at 8.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Krause & Sekiguchi, supra note 28, at 386.
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tion of the kind that befell the Chinese in the 1800s, it decided to indus-
trialize. The trading companies were simply a necessary result of this
desire to industrialize and of "the ignorance of the Japanese about for-
eign markets, their lack of knowledge of foreign languages, and their
desire to become a participant in the world economy. 76
General trading companies did not develop in the West because
there was no need for them. First, the West's institutions for interna-
tional trade had already developed over an extended period of time,
and the formation costs were spread out during the entire time. In
comparison, Japan had placed itself in national isolation (sakoku) for
200 years and was required to develop quickly after the Open Door
policy was imposed upon it by Commodore Perry. 7 Second, Western
linguistic and cultural similarities, as well as geographical proximity,
made the absolute costs of information, of negotiation, and of enforce-
ment of contracts much lower for the West than for Japan.78 Third, the
West had a highly developed capital market in which corporations
could obtain necessary funds. In Japan, however, the capital market
was virtually nonexistent.79 Finally, while the industrial system of the
West was composed of many large corporations that could market their
own goods, the Japanese industrial structure was a dual-style system in
which the majority of manufacturing occurred in a cottage-industry
setting and required other large corporations to market the manufac-
tured goods. 80
Why is it, though, that Mitsui and Mitsubishi and the other
sogoshosha, out of all the thousands of trading companies in Japan,
became the behemoth general trading companies?8 The answer is sim-
ple: historical placement and access to capital. For example, Mitsui
and Mitsubishi were some of the first entrants into the import/export
field. Moreover, Mitsui was an established and respected name from
the Tokugawa era (1615-1868), had been made the fiscal agent of the
Meiji government (1868-1912), and had the backing of the Mitsui
Bank.82 Thus, it was already well established and well known. In com-
parison, Sumitomo Shoji, which was the trading company for the
Sumitomo group, a comparative late-comer into the import/export
76 Id. at 389.
77 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 193-94.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Caves & Uekusa, Industrial Organization, in ASiA'S NEW GIANT: How THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY WORKS 508 (Patrick & Rosovsky ed. 1976).
81 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 192.
82 Id See also J. ROBERTS, supra note 52.
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field, had access to large amounts of capital and large markets (mostly
firms within its group) because it was a member of the solid, closely-
knit Sumitomo group.83 In sum, the present-day sogoshosha had their
origins in the Japanese industrialization process which began in the late
1800s.
By 1945 the sogoshosha had attained a crucial role in the world-
wide operations of the zaibatsu by functioning as the central mover of
goods and credit within the zaibatsu and by marketing the products
manufactured by the zaibatsu throughout the world. The conclusion of
World War II and the Allied occupation of Japan, however, caused
significant changes in the structure and operation of the sogoshosha.
The following section details those changes and shows the course of
development followed by the sogoshosha from 1945 to the present.
III. POSTwAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOGOSHOSH
After World War II, the military occupation authorities, and in
particular General Douglas McArthur, the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers in Asia (SCAP), were faced with the task of trying to
help Japan rebuild, while eradicating the causes which the Allies be-
lieved had contributed to Japan's imperialistic and violent expansion in
the Pacific Basin. To accomplish the first task, SCAP began a study of
the war-shattered Japanese economy. A group of American scientific
advisors reported that Japan's economic reconstruction would depend
heavily upon intensive scientific and technological development, be-
cause only then could manufacturing productivity -increase.84
To eradicate Japanese imperialism, SCAP ordered the dissolution
of the zaibatsu because-SCAP believed-they were one of the moving
forces behind the Japanese war effort. In July 1947, SCAP specifically
dissolved Mitsui Bussan Trading Co. and Mitsubishi Shoji Trading
Co., the most important enterprises within the Mitsui and Mitsubishi
zaibatsu.85 Mitsui Bussan was divided into 200 companies and Mitsub-
ishi Shoji into 139.86
Because the zaibatsu no longer existed, no one remained to con-
duct Japan's international trade. Hence, Allied military authorities
conducted all such trade until 1948.87 Beginning in 1948, however, pri-
vate Japanese trading firms resumed the responsibility for international
83 Yamamura, supra note 17, at 193.
84 S. OHKrrA, GUTSU-SHIGEN-KEIZAI [Technology-Natural Resources-Economy] 4 (1949).
85 H. IyoRi, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN 12 (1969).
86 Id.
87 THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 135.
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trade.8" It was at this time that the current structure of the sogoshosha
also began to develop, for it was during the early 1950s that Japan's
leading manufacturing firms -and largest commercial banks-en-
couraged and supported by the Japanese government through its Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)-began to develop a
new system of keiresau groups.
The manufacturing firms found this system particularly suited to
their immediate postwar needs. Their equity capital had been severely
depleted by the war effort and they had to contend with galloping post-
war inflation. 89 Hence, they had to rely extensively upon their banks to
satisfy their needs for both long- and short-term loans.9° These needs
resulted in an extremely high debt to equity ratio of about three to one
and made the manufacturing firms even further dependent upon their
banks, which were in turn completely dependent upon the Bank of
Japan.
9 1
It was this unique relationship between manufacturing enterprises
and banks-a structure that evolved as an historical accident-that
provided the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan with effec-
tive levers to use both monetary policy, such as the central bank's sup-
ply of money, and fiscal policy, such as the government's investments
and industrial promotions, to stimulate the Japanese economy.92 The
government had already decided to implement a long-term growth pol-
icy whereby MITI would aid mainly a few large and growth-minded
firms in key industries such as steel, chemicals, and automobiles.93
These large businesses, nourished by MITI, in turn were to pull up
smaller manufacturers which were part of their group.94 As part of this
long-term growth plan for selected industries, MITI let weaker firms
88 Id.




93 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 63.
94 THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 13. The role that MITI played in Japan's
post-war economic recovery is of great interest to political economists and businessmen alike.
One scholar notes that MITI "has presided over... the fastest growing industrial economy that
ever existed and has administered the growth of Japanese foreign trade at a rate some three times
greater than the growth rate of all international trade during the postwar generation. . ." John-
son, MITI and Japanese Economic Policy, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MODERN JAPAN 227
(Scalapino ed. 1977). Some foreigners have even called MITI the "ministry of one-way trade"
and "the corporate headquarters of Japan, Inc." Id.
Other authors have commented that "Japan must be the only capitalist country in the world
in which the government decides how many firms should be in a given industry, and then sets
about to arrange the desired number." K. OHKAWA & H. RosovsKY, JAPANESE ECONOMIC
GROWTH 223 (1973). See also R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN
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and industries die a natural death at each downturn of the economy.95
As a result of this policy, the growth of the selected firms and their
trading companies began to increase. At first, the trading companies
were forced to execute barter trades because of the dollar shortage. 6
Because they had to exchange finished products for raw materials, they
were forced to develop adequate internal abilities to effect barter
trade.97 Then, as the domestic demand increased, these selected firms
attained sufficient size and economies of scale, enabling them to com-
pete in the world market.98 Their rapidly growing export market then
provided them with the opportunity to increase their economies of scale
and thus become even more competitive.99
This change in the composition of the Japanese export system in
favor of capital intensive and technological industries presented the
trading companies with an opportunity to restructure the keiretsu. The
trading companies began linking the large-scale oligopolistic enter-
prises that produced intermediate materials to the small enterprises that
performed various downstream operations."° For example, in the
synthetic fiber industry the trading companies integrated the large fiber
manufacturers with firms performing spinning, weaving, dyeing,, and
apparel manufacturing.101 In the steel industry the trading companies
integrated the producers with various types of steel fabrication firms.10 2
The trading companies used the familiar techniques of partial equity
ownership, management and technical assistance, and credit extension
to secure these keiretsu ties.103
The trading companies benefited greatly from this newly restruc-
tured keiretsu system. The most important benefit was the great flex-
ibility in the mix of export products. Depending on consumer demand,
the trading companies could export fiber directly, yarn from associated
spinning firms, woven cloth, or even clothing.'0 4 Another benefit was
the favorable position of keiretsu firms established abroad. Because
these firms imported most of their intermediate needs from the larger
148-54 (1976) (description of MITI's "administrative guidance" through use of trade associations
and industry-wide coordinating groups).
95 THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 13.
96 Id. at 136.
97 Id.
98 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 63.
99 Id.
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firms with which they were associated, they gained from the economies
of scale enjoyed by the affiliate back home. In return, this affiliate had
a fairly captive buyer in Japan.' These affiliated firms also were able
to receive favorable credit from the trading company and to take ad-
vantage of the trading company's distribution economies of scale in the
host country. 10 6 Finally, these firms had direct access to new techno-
logical developments generated by the keiretsu parent company in Ja-
pan.'0 7 As a result of these advantages the keiretsu firms abroad
flourished, and their trading companies also flourished as they strove to
fulfill their clients' needs.
A. Current Functions of the Sogoshosha
As we have seen, the sogoshosha act as one-stop exporters for their
clients: they provide financing, market research, management exper-
tise, shipping, insurance, warehousing, and wholesale and retail distri-
bution. In doing so, the top nine trading companies had total sales of
$287 billion for fiscal year 1980, or sales totalling about one-quarter of
Japan's gross national product (GNP)." 8 The sogoshosha thus ac-
counted for 54.5% of Japan's imports and 48.2% of her exports. 19
As the size and scope of activities conducted by the sogoshosha
expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, their internal structure and oper-
ations became more refined. During the 1960s they vigorously pursued
a strategy of creating supply and demand through upstream integration
into the areas of production, prospecting, and development, and
through downstream integration into the areas of processing, wholesale
distribution, and retail sales. 10
To manage this expansion effectively, the sogoshosha organized
into divisions along major product lines, each of which had considera-
ble autonomy. "' This increased autonomy was necessary because each
division had to conduct negotiations and consummate deals throughout
the world under varying conditions; each required a detailed knowl-
edge of essential products and markets and an ability to respond quick-
105 Id. at 70-71.
106 Id. at 71.
107 Id.
108 Kanabayashi, supra note 7, at 56, col. 2. In fiscal year 1976, the top ten trading companies
had total sales of $155 billion, representing 31% of Japan's GNP. They accounted for 56% of
Japan's imports and exports and almost 20% of total domestic wholesale trade in Japan. Their
export and overseas transactions represented slightly over 5% of total world trade. A. YOUNG,
supra note 22, at 4.
109 Kanabayashi, supra note 7, at 56, col. 2.
110 A. YoUNG, supra note 22, at 110.
111 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 98.
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ly to changes.11 2 In return for this autonomy, each division underwent
rigorous evaluation including a sales volume check at least semi-
annually. 13
Further changes have occurred as the trading companies and their
client manufacturing firms began facing increased competition from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea in textiles and metal fabrications be-
cause of the relatively low entry costs into these fields. 1 4  First, the
manufacturing firms upgraded and expanded their product lines." 5
They increased their product differentiation by promoting brand
names, beginning vertical integration abroad, and seeking system-wide
benefits by building multinational networks. 1 6 The primary material
plants that were established abroad as part of the vertical integration
program began producing for the world market, not just the domestic
market of the host country, because the domestic market was too small
for efficient production." 7
The sogoshosha and their client manufacturing firms also started
affiliating with competitor foreign multinationals, as well as other
Japanese firms, in various joint ventures. Several reasons made this
course of action popular: it allowed each firm to learn from the others'
operations and gave the firm access to the others' cost and pricing struc-
tures; it built a community of interest among rivals, thereby increasing
the propensity for cooperation, which could provide important business
information (e.g., cost structures) unknown to unaffiliated domestic ri-
vals also operating abroad; and it provided already established distri-
bution channels at a comparatively lower cost.118
To take full advantage of these changes, the sogoshosha rear-
ranged their internal structure. First, they made a limited effort to
switch from a commodity-based organization (e.g., coal or oil, with di-
112 Id.
113 Id. at 99. This emphasis on sales volume and rapid turnover of goods results from the need
to offset the high fixed cost of supporting global networks of personnel, offices, and telecommuni-
cations. Id. at 98-99. For the annual turnover per employee, see Table A-7 in the appendix.
114 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 72-75, 95-105.
115 Id.
116 Id. The trading companies' own affiliates are a critical component of the corporate struc-
ture. "Affiliates" refers to both subsidiaries in which the trading company has majority owner-
ship, and related firms in which the trading company owns between 10% and 50% of the stock.
The Japanese call subsidiaries kogaisha (children firms), and related firms keiretat kigyo (related
firms). A. YoUNG, supra note 22, at 45-46.
117 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 72-75, 95-105. Tables A-I and A-
4 in the appendix show the extent to which the sogoshosha and their clients have established
subsidiaries abroad.
118 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 72-75, 95-105.
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visions thereof) to a system-wide organization (e.g., energy)." 9 This
step eliminated double staffing for procurement and marketing and af-
forded major customers better service because of vertical integration
from the development of sources to the marketing of finished
products.120
Next, the sogoshosha established corporate development groups to
help product divisions find new areas of activity. These groups had a
better capacity for project analysis and development and were better
able to resolve interdivisional conflicts that arose as products cut across
traditional product lines.12 1 They also aided the product division by
mobilizing external resources. For example, they identified potential
partners both local and domestic, negotiated the terms of participation,
organized new business entities, and recruited key executives.1
22
Finally, the sogoshosha established regional headquarters staffed
with senior executives to expedite the cross-hauling of goods among
foreign units.'23 For example, in 1974 Mitsui organized regional cen-
ters in North and South America, Europe, and Oceania, while Maru-
beni established a European regional headquarters in Brussels to
manage and coordinate six wholly-owned subsidiaries, three branches,
and five offices in Europe, as well as one branch and twelve offices in
Africa. 124
Although the foregoing shows that the sogoshosha have been suc-
cessful in adapting to adjustments in the international trade arena and
have made changes to complement the changes that occur within their
customers' operations, the question remains as to how the customers
themselves assess the contributions of the trading companies. The data
presented in Table 1, below, generally show that in all areas except
exportation, the perceived value of the sogoshosha's contributions de-
clines as the customers become more sophisticated.
119 Id. at 116-17.
120 Id.







Table 1: Managers' assessments of the contributions of trading






















Average Rating Normalized Rating
LEss 10 OR LEsS 10 OR
THAN 4 5-9 MORE THAN 4 5-9 MORE
TOTAL VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES
4.63 5.31 4.82 3.57 0.97 1.45 1.47
4.23 5.13 4.10 3.36 0.71 0.87 0.85







3.58 3.72 3.67 3.21 0.72 0.37 0.72
3.30 4.91 2.67 2.20 0.52 -0.56 -0.51
3.05 4.01 3.02 1.98 -0.42 -0.37 -0.61
0.92 1.07 0.62 1.47 -3.42 -2.62 -0.13
* The scales used are as follows: 6 = Very important; 0 = Not important at all. "Joint ventures"
refers to manufacturing operations undertaken by the firm in conjunction with a sogoshosha.
As seen in Table 2 below, an apparent corollary of this decline in im-
portance is a concomitant increase in perceived conflicts with the trad-
ing companies as their customers develop.
125 Table Source: M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 124 (Harvard
University Press, 1976). Reprinted with permission.
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Table 2: Managers' assessments of the conflicts associated with
trading companies as partners in joint ventures by


















Average Rating Normalized Rating
LESS 10 OR LESS 10 OR
THAN 4 5-9 MORE THAN 4 5-9 MORE
TOTAL VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES VENTURES
2.24 1.31 2.15 3.54 0.35 0.44 0.80
2.18 1.43 1.95 3.46 0.48 0.20 0.05
2.11 1.01 2.05 2.61 0.03 0.29 0.24
2.05 0.87 2.20 3.31 -0.08 0.45 0.56













1.08 0.44 0.90 2.15 -0.52 -0.85 -0.74
* The scales used are as follows: 6 = Very important; 0 = Not important at all. "Joint ventures"
refers to manufactureing operations undertaken by the firm in conjunction with a sogososha.
In any event, it is clear that at least in the early and middle stages
of joint venture participation the sogoshosha play a highly valued role
in helping their clients. Moreover, because the data reflected in Tables
1 and 2 are somewhat dated, they may not be a completely accurate
assessment of the sogoshosha's current value, for the sogoshosha have
made recent changes in their structure and operations to accomodate
changes in the conduct of international trade during the past decade.
B. Antitrust Policy and Enforcement as a Factor in Sogoshosha
Growth
As we have seen, the sogoshosha are enormous business organiza-
tions comprised of many related firms, both in Japan and abroad. In
many instances the sogoshosha have deliberately organized various
firms within a given product area into vertical structures running from
raw material production through fabrication and marketing to retail
distribution in all markets of the world. No doubt such an arrange-
ment by an American corporation would violate antitrust laws against
126 Table Source: M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 125 (Harvard
University Press, 1976). Reprinted with permission.
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vertical mergers, or at least would be the subject of law suits or other
action by the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission.
This is not the case in Japan.
Despite this, some scholars contend that the sogoshosha are not
even oligopolistic-much less monopolistic. For example, one writer
contends that:
Japan's ten largest trading companies are definitely not monopolies, nor
are they oligopolies if oligopoly is strictly defined as "a market situation
where sellers are so few that any one of them can affect the market
price..." Neither the big six, nor for that matter the big two, are oligop-
olies in that sense. 127
This unsupported assertion, however, is undercut by the data presented
below.
Another author argues that although the risk of oligopoly is pres-
ent among the sogoshosha, there are at least four factors militating
against the creation of an oligopoly. 28 First, he argues, there are
thousands of trading firms. While this statement is indeed true, there
are only nine general trading companies. The "thousands" of trading
firms refers to the small trading firms which specialize in a given prod-
uct (senmonshosha). The author's second reason is that the larger man-
ufacturers can market their goods directly. This assertion also is true to
a degree, but it fails to consider that even the large manufacturers use
the sogoshosha and that there can be but few manufacturers who con-
trol as much market share as the sogoshosha. Third, the author argues,
it is easy to enter the sogoshosha field. Perhaps this statement is true of
the field in which the senmonshosha participate, but doubtful with re-
spect to the sogoshosha. After all, their ranks have changed little in the
past thirty years. Moreover, few firms have the capability to amass the
amount of capital and the number of trained personnel necessary for
success. Finally, the author contends that the sogoshosha do not set the
prices for the products they sell. Rather, they merely set the commis-
sion fees. This argument overlooks the ability of the sogoshosha to
advise their clients, who may be ignorant of foreign markets, as to ap-
propriate marketable prices for their goods in foreign countries. There-
fore, they may be setting prices indirectly.
In any event, all of the foregoing arguments ignore the reality of
the sogoshosha's market share for various products. In fiscal 1975, the
big ten sogoshosha had 82% of the market share for exported metals,
65% in chemicals, 61% in textiles, and 47% in machinery.'29 They had
127 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 49.
128 Krause & Sekiguchi, supra note 28, at 394.
129 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 50.
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an 81% share in Japanese imports of foodstuffs, 71% in chemicals, 74%
in textiles, 54% in metal ores and fuels, and 33% in all other commodity
groups.130 Moreover, in some cases the sogoshosha control the sources
of supply so strictly that it is virtually impossible for distributors to buy
except through the sogoshosha.131
Surprisingly, the Japanese antitrust laws, which apparently pose
little, if any, threat to such concentrations of market share, were origi-
nally very similar to the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act. The history of the development of
antitrust laws in Japan also shows that they were intended to perform a
function similar to the American antitrust laws.
Before the Second World War there was no antitrust legislation in
Japan. 132 After the surrender of Japan to the Allies, however, the Oc-
cupation authorities quickly disbanded the zaibatsu and passed the
Law Relating to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of
Preserving Fair Trade (Antimonopoly Law). 133 The purpose of the law
was to forestall any return to the prewar oligopolistic structure of Japa-
nese industry in which cartels controlled almost every major industrial
activity. 134
The substantive provisions of the Antimonopoly Law as originally
enacted 135 prohibited the following: (1) private monopolization or un-
reasonable restraint of trade (section 3); (2) formation of stock holding
companies, the principal business of which would be to control the
business activities of corporations whose stock they hold (section 10);
(3) the holding by financial institutions of more than 10% of the stock
of another corporation (section 11); (4) interlocking directorates among
companies in a competitive position (section 13); (5) an officer of a
company from becoming an officer of another company if one fourth or
more of the officers of his company were officers of that other company
(section 13); (6) any person from being an officer of four or more com-
130 Id.
131 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 7.
132 Foreign Trade andAntitrust Law: Hearings Before the Subcomrn on Antitrust and Monopoly
ofthe Senate Comr. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 977 (1965) [hereinafter cited asAntitrust
Hearings]. To combat the monopolies of the four zaibatsu, during the 1920s and 1930s the Japa-
nese government enacted laws that permitted cartels of traders, producers, wholesalers, and retail-
ers. Id. In 1937, the government authorized the formation of import and export associations. Id.
These various cartels could establish quotas, curtail production, allocate markets, and fix prices.
Id.
133 Law No. 54 of 1947; see Antitrust Hearings, supra note 132, at 977-78.
134 Antitrust Hearings, supra note 132, at 978. See also H. 1yoRi, supra note 85, at 8-17.




panies (section 13); (7) any company from holding more than 25% of
another company's debentures (section 12); and (8) the merger or trans-
fer of any business without the prior approval of the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission (sections 15, 16). The Japanese Fair Trade Com-
mission (JFTC), the first independent regulatory agency in the history
of Japan, was established by the same law and was charged with its
enforcement.136
The penalties for violation of the Antimonopoly Law were, in
comparison to its American counterpart, very lenient. The maximum
criminal penalty for violation of the law was a fine of 500,000 yen and
penal servitude of not more than three years. 137 With the exchange rate
averaging about 225 yen to the dollar during July 1981, this fine was
equivalent to about $2,222. Although this fine was increased ten-fold
in the mid-1970s to 5 million yen, or about $22,222.00,131 it still pales in
comparison to the American fines of $1,000,000.00 for corporations and
$100,000.00 for individuals and up to five years imprisonment. 139
The civil damages provisions of the law also are comparatively
weak. The most striking difference is that the Japanese law does not
allow treble damages.'40 Moreover, a person who has been damaged
by unreasonable restraint of trade, private monopolization, or unfair
business practices may not sue for damages until the JFTC has for-
mally found a violation, whether by JFTC decision, a consent decree,
or formal JFTC recommendations. 14 1
Despite its comparative moderation, the Antimonopoly Law as en-
acted quickly came under attack. Many businessmen contended that
the law fostered excessive competition, and, indeed, one scholar notes
that the Japanese never use the word "competition" unless it is pre-
ceded by the word "excessive."' 142 In any case, however, the Antimono-
poly Law was amended three times by 1953. The prohibition against
intercorporate ownership of debentures in excess of 25% was abolished;
136 H. Iyo~i, supra note 85, at 15, 163.
137 Law No. 54 of 1949, § 89 (as amended), reprinted in H. IyoP., supra note 85, at 182.
138 Haley, Antitrust in Japan: Froblems of Enforcement, in CuRRENT LEGAL AsPECTS OF DO-
ING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 123 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
139 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
140 Haley, supra note 138, at 123.
141 Law No. 54 of 1949, § 26 (as amended), reprinted in H. IyoRI, supra note 85, at 163. See
alsd Haley, supra note 138, at 123. Most Japanese legal scholars believe that this provision of the
Antimonopoly Law does not preclude a tort action under the Civil Code, but proof of negligence
or willful conduct would be required to prove a violation. Id.
142 Hearing on Foreign Trade and the Antitrust Laws Before the Subcomrt on Antitrust and
Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1964) (testimony of Dr.
Eleanor M. Hadley) [hereinafter cited as Hadley Testimony].
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the restrictions on intercorporate shareholding, interlocking director-
ates, and multiple directorates were relaxed so that they are now pro-
hibited only if they result in a substantial restraint of competition in
any particular field of trade; and the prohibition of mergers and trans-
fers without prior JFTC approval was replaced with a prior notification
system that decreed automatic approval unless the JFTC acted within
thirty days. 143
Another important modification of the Japanese antitrust laws
during this period was the enactment of a provision allowing for the
formation of depression cartels, rationalization cartels, and export/im-
port cartels. Under section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act, entrepre-
neurs may engage in "concerted activity" and form depression cartels
without violating the Act when an extreme disequilibrium of supply
and demand for a particular commodity exists and when:
1. the price of such commodity is below the average cost of production
and a "considerable part" of the entrepreneurs in the trade concerned
may eventually be forced to discontinue production; and
2. it is difficult to overcome such circumstances as mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph by the rationalization of individual enterprises.'"
In order to qualify for this depression cartel exemption, the entrepre-
neurs must receive prior approval by the JFTC.'45 They also may enter
into price fixing agreements if their concerted activities are unsuccess-
ful and if they receive JFTC approval.1 46
Producers can lawfully form rationalization cartels and engage in
concerted activities when such activities are found "particularly neces-
sary for effecting an advancement in technology, an improvement in
the quality of goods, a reduction in costs, an increase in efficiency and
any other rationalization of enterprises."' 147 As in the case of depres-
sion cartels, prior JFTC approval is necessary.1 48
The final permissible cartel activity is in the export/import area.
Under the Export and Import Trading Act of 1952,' 4 9 "[e]xporters may
143 H. [yoRI, supra note 85, at 18-20; Antitrust Hearings, supra note 132, at 981-83.
144 Law No. 54 of 1953, § 24-3(l), reprinr'ed in H. IYoRi, supra note 85, at 160. The terms
"concerted activity" and "considerable part" are not defined in the Act. While the term "rational-
ization is not defined explidtly in the Act, section 24-4(1) discussing rationalization cartels indi-
cates the intended meaning. That section states:
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to concerted activities of producers approved
in accordance with the following subsection, where they are found particularly necessary for
effecting an advancement in technology, an improvement in the quality of goods, a reduction
in costs, an increase in efficiency and any other rationalization of enterprises.
Id. § 24-4(1), reprinted in H. IYORI, supra note 85, at 161.
145 Id. § 24-3(2), reprinted in H. lYoRi, supra note 85, at 160.
146 Id. § 24-3(3), reprinted in H. IYons, supra note 85, at 160.
147 Id. § 24-4(1), reprinted in H. IYORI, supra note 85, at 161.
148 Id. § 24-4(2), reprinted in H. IYons, supra note 85, at 162.
149 Law No. 229 of 1952, reprinted in H. IYo,, supra note 85, at 212.
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enter into an agreement on price, quantity, quality, design or any other
matter in relation to commodities of a particular kind to be exported to
a specific destination" by notifying the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) within ten days from the date of conclusion of
such agreement. 150 MITI may modify or prohibit such agreement if it
violates a treaty or other international agreement, if it injures the inter-
ests of importers or enterprises at the destination, if it gravely injures
international confidence in Japanese exporters, if it injures the sound
development of export trade, if it discriminates unjustly, if it unjustly
restricts participation or withdrawal, or if it unjustly injures consumers
or concerned enterprises. 5' Similarly, importers may "enter into an
agreement on price, quantity, quality or any other matters in regard to
import by obtaining the authorization of the Minister of International
Trade and Industry," when, in essence, there exists: excessive import
competition and international agreement requiring importation from
the specific place of shipment, high import prices from said location
compared to other locations, a difference in the quality of imports from
such location compared to other locations, or uncertainty of continuous
importation of commodities to be produced by exploitation of re-
sources in a foreign country." 2
Although no data exist to show whether these cartelization laws
have given Japanese manufacturers a competitive advantage over their
American counterparts who do not have the benefit of any laws al-
lowing such cartels--except for the Webb-Pomerene Actl 3-it is in-
structive to note that during the period from 1955 to 1968 there were
twenty-six depression cartels'5 4 and eleven rationalization cartels.155 In
short, it is evident that Japanese manufacturers can engage in concerted
activity that would be illegal in America, and that such activity benefits
them to some degree.
150 Id. § 5, reprinted in H. IyoR, supra note 85, at 212-14.
151 Id. § 5-bis, reprinted in H. Iyo~i, supra note 85, at 212.
152 Id. § 7-2, reprinted in H. IYoRi, supra note 85, at 214-15.
153 Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1980). This Act grants an exemption from the
United States antitrust laws to
an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade; or an agreement
or act done in the course of export trade by such association, provided such association,
agreement or act is not in restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of
the export trade of any domestic competitor of such association....
Id. at § 62.
154 H. Iyoiu, supra note 85, at 135-36.
155 Id. at 136. Moreover, one scholar has noted that America actually promotes cartelization in
Japan because of American insistence on "voluntary" quotas: the "only way a 'voluntary' quota
can operate in the exporting nation is for the exporters of the industry in question to get together
and decide upon quotas." Hadley Testimony, supra note 142, at 154.
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Another significant difference between the Japanese and American
antitrust laws is the degree to which they are enforced. From 1966 to
1975, the JFTC-under the Antimonopoly Law and two other laws
over which the JFTC has primary jurisdiction-used the formal adju-
dication process through completion of hearings and issuance of ad-
ministrative judgments only twenty-one times. 5 6  Adding consent
decrees and three instances in which proceedings were dropped, there
were still only thirty administrative litigations over an entire decade.' 57
Obviously, there could have been no more than thirty civil suits for
antitrust violations during that decade because, as noted above, a pri-
vate litigant cannot sue until the JFTC has taken formal action.158
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that the sogoshosha and
their group firms and banks engaged in significant merger activity dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s. From 1963 to 1964 the number of major
mergers doubled. 159 The consolidation of Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy
Industries, New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Ship-
building and Engineering into Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was one of
the largest mergers.' 6° Apparently this merger was successful: in the
fiscal year ending March 31, 1981, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had
sales of $6.5 billion.'6'
These trading company merger activities were part of a larger
movement, spearheaded by the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Fuji, Daiichi,
Kangyo, Sumitomo, Tokyo, and Sanwa Banks to consolidate the major
156 Rabinowitz, Anirust in Japan, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
AND EAST ASIA 106 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
157 Id. The usual pattern of antitrust enforcement in Japan has been termed, by at least one
writer, as a process of "law enforcement by bargaining." Haley, supra note 138, at 125. This
process of "administrative guidance" is informal advice by the JFTC to a party that the Commis-
sion believes is engaged in prohibited activity. The guidance takes various forms, from informal
suggestion to written directives or warnings, and is then followed by voluntary compliance only
because neither a legally binding order nor other formal disposition is issued. It may be either
promotional or restrictive and backed by an implicit or explicit promise of either reward or sanc-
tion. Id. at 124.
The power of the JFTC to issue formal orders, to bring criminal proceedings, or to publicize
alleged violations supports this administrative guidance. To the extent, though, that other govern-
mental agencies believe the JFTC to be acting improperly, the party to whom guidance is given
still has significant room to maneuver, for unlike MITI or the Ministry of Finance, the JFTC lacks
the arsenal of carrots and sticks available to the other ministries. The JFTC does not license
occupations, approve imports or foreign exchange, or give subsidies. Id. In sum, "at the outset
there is a general acknowledgement that the [JFTC's] position is relatively weak, leaving room for
both sides to negotiate to reach an informal resolution." Id. (emphasis supplied).
158 See supra text accompanying note 141.
159 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 115.
160 Id.
161 Mitsubishi 4 Japanese giantsplans for growth in the U.S., Bus. Wy., July 20, 1981, at 128
[hereinafter referred to as Mitsubishi plans for growth].
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Japanese conglomerate enterprise groups by means of expanded mu-
tual stock holdings and transactions among group firms. 162 Each of
these banks envisioned a highly consolidated conglomerate-group cen-
tered on one main bank and one core sogoshosha and containing one
giant corporation from each major industrial sector.1 63
These visions have borne fruit. In 1971, the Daiichi Bank and the
Kangyo Bank merged to form Daiichi Kangyo Bank, thus becoming
the largest commercial bank in Japan.'6 This new bank then became
the main bank of a large new group bearing its name, consisting of
firms that previously belonged to the Kawasaki (Kawasaki Heavy In-
dustries, Kawasaki Locomotives, and Kawasaki Aircraft Industry) and
Furukawa groups, and having C. Itoh & Co. as the core sogoshosha 65
Other such mergers also were successful. For example, concentration
of the Mitsubishi group 166 provides a representative picture of the cor-
porate consolidation which prevails in Japan:
Table 3: Corporate Members of the Mitsubishi Group' 67
Sales in
Industrial Sector Corporations Billions of Dollars
Trading Mitsubishi Corp. $68.3
Cement, Glass, Paper Asahi Glass $ 2.3
Mitsubishi Mining
and Cement $ 1.2
Mitsubishi Paper
Mills $ 0.7






Mitsubishi Rayon $ 0.9




166 Mitsubishiplansfor growth, Bus. WK., supra note 161 (fiscal year ending March 21, 1980).
167 This table was compiled from data contained in the article in Bus. W, supra note 161. Of
these sales, $16 billion were with the United States, including $13.9 billion of trading by the
American subsidiary of the Mitsubishi sogoshosha. Id.
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In sum, the 28-member Mitsubishi group had sales of $123 billion and
banking assets of $103 billion in 1981.
At various times the Japanese government has attempted to re-
strict the activities and concentration of the sogoshosha and other oligo-
polistic or monopolistic industries. After the "oil shock" of 1973 and
1974, during which the Japanese public complained vociferously of ex-




became especially concerned. In January 1974, the JFTC completed a
study of the sogoshosha and declared an intent to revise the antitrust
laws. The revision would have restricted the stock holdings in other
companies by firms whose capital stock exceeded 10 billion yen and by
firms that had total assets exceeding 200 billion yen. 168 The proposed
antitrust law revision would have limited the size of a stock investment
by a Japanese firm in another domestic firm to the investor firm's capi-
tal stock or one-half of its total assets, whichever was larger. 169 There
was little doubt that the JFTC's main target was the sogoshosha be-
cause eleven of them were among the forty-nine target firms and be-
cause the excess stock holdings of these eleven sogoshosha were two
and one-half times larger than the excess stock holding of the other
thirty-eight firms that were targeted.170 This revision, however, never
became law and thus the sogoshosha were able to retain about $2.9
billion in domestic stocks, which otherwise would have been sold.
17 1
Several other proposed modifications of the Antimonopoly Law
arose in the mid-1970s. Among these were: (1) splitting up monopolis-
tic enterprises, i.e., where one firm controlled 50% of the market or
where three firms had 75%; (2) rolling back prices set by illegal cartels
(currently the law only allows the JFTC to nullify illegal price-fixing
agreements); (3) imposing surcharges on profits made by unlawful
price-fixing cartels; (4) lowering from 10% to 5% the amount of stock in
other domestic firms which a financial institution can hold; and (5) in-
creasing the criminal penalty for violation of the antitrust laws from
500,000 yen to 5 million yen. 172 The business community rigorously
opposed all of these proposals, 73 and only the last of them became
law. 174
In sum, it is evident that the Japanese antitrust laws impose far
fewer restrictions upon the concentration and consolidation of Japa-
nese business, especially given the government's minimal efforts at en-
forcement, than the American antitrust laws and their enforcement
impose upon American business. Antitrust suits like the recent ones in
the United States against IBM or AT&T are unheard of in Japan. Sim-
ilarly, there is no case in the history of Japan's antitrust law to compare




172 Ariga, Efforts to Revise the Japanese Antimonopo l Act, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 703, 709-14
(1976).
173 Id. at 724.
174 1 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 10.03[61, at 10-19 (Kitagaiva ed. 1980).
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to the civil damage suit filed by Westinghouse against the alleged ura-
nium cartel. Furthermore, cartelization appears to be a way of life
among Japanese businesses, though many of the activities associated
therewith would be in flagrant violation of American antitrust laws and
subject to quick and severe governmental retaliation. Cartelization is
important because, as we have seen above, one of the three major func-
tions of a general trading company is to take advantage of economies
of scale. By having the freedom to consolidate, coordinate, and cooper-
ate legally, the sogoshosha are better able to achieve their enormous
economies of scale.
C. Financial Structure of the Sogoshosha
One of the crucial services performed by the sogoshosha for their
customers is providing the money necessary to produce and market
their goods, both domestically and internationally. In order to extend
vital credits, loans, loan guarantees, and venture capital to customers
and suppliers, the sogoshosha must amass a phenomenal amount of
capital, both owned and borrowed.'75 In fiscal year 1974, the ten larg-
est trading companies employed a total capital (total liabilities plus net
worth) of 16,614 billion yen, or $55,379 million. 17 6 Mitsui and Mitsub-
ishi employed larger capitals (3,426 billion and 3,201 billion yen re-
spectively) than Nippon Steel Corp. (2,271 billion yen), which is the




A staggering 97% of the total capital employed by the sogoshosha
is comprised of liabilities, 78 a ready indicator that the trading compa-
nies borrow heavily. For example, during fiscal year 1974 alone Mitsui
borrowed $11,086 million, or 97.2% out of a total employed capital of
$11,420 million; and Mitsubishi borrowed $10,397 million, or 97.4% out
of total employed capital of $10,671 million. 179 This practice of bor-
rowing up to 97% or more of total capital and maintaining a 1:1 current
ratio (current ratio = total current assets to total current liabilities) has
been the accepted method of business among the sogoshosha since
World War 1II8 This pattern of business has had the support, and
175 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 71.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 71-72.
178 Id. at 72.
179 Id. at 72-74.




even the encouragement, of financial institutions, which in turn have
had the strong backing of the Bank of Japan. 181 Although this way of
financing operations might horrify Western businessmen, it has ena-
bled the sogoshosha to provide their customers with the financial serv-
ices described above.
The sogoshosha came to rely primarily on bank loans to finance
their operations for several reasons. During the 1950s and 1960s, the
largest problem facing Japanese corporations was capital procurement.
The Japanese stock market could provide only a limited amount of
capital because it was underdeveloped.1 82 Moreover, equity financing
in Japan was and still is very expensive, both because of the corporate
tax deduction which is allowed for interest payments but not for divi-
dend distributions and because new stock in Japan is generally issued
at par value rather than at or near its market price. When a new stock
is sold at par value, a greater number of shares must be sold to raise a
given sum, and, as a result, more money must be paid out in dividends,
assuming that the dividend rate is left unchanged. 3 Furthermore, the
larger number of dividends creates a special problem for Japanese
business, making equity financing even more expensive. Dividend
rates in Japan usually exceed interest rates because Japanese firms like
to maintain high dividends as a matter of prestige.184 Another reason
for expensive equity financing in Japan is that the high growth rate of
corporate profits is combined with moderate price/earnings ratios-
thus, "a firm selling new stock is turning over to stockholders a fixed
share of a rapidly growing earnings stream."185
Because equity capital was so costly and because there was no ma-
ture market for debentures and other long-term debt instruments,18 6
the sogoshosha turned to approximately ten large commercial banks,
commonly called "city banks," for money.1 7 These banks gave prefer-
ential treatment to selected firms, which in turn placed their deposits
with the banks. 18  Out of this arrangement grew the bank-centered
to 1 and that Japanese banks will lend money at this ratio. In America, however, bankers usually
demand a 2 to 1 assets/liabilities ratio before lending money. Wallich & Wallich, h'anlcng and
Finance, in AstA's NEw GLANr. How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 272 (Patrick & Rosovsky
ed. 1976).
181 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 74.
182 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPIsEs, Supra note 21, at 15.
183 Wallich & Wallich, upra note 180, at 268.
184 T. ADAMs & L Hosm, A FiNANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW JAPAN 128 (1972).
185 Wallich & Wallich, supra note 180, at 269.
186 Caves & Uekusa, supra note 80, at 4.
187 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRIsES, sufpra note 21, at 15.
188 Id.
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trading groups, of which the most dominant ones were Fuyo, Fuji
Bank, Daiichi Kangyo, and Sanwa.'8 9
The amount of debt carried by the sogoshosha is staggering by
American standards. Table 4 shows that in 1978 the debt/equity ratio
of the nine sogoshosha ranged from 8.7 to 15.6, and the average was
over 12.5.
Table 4: Debt-Equity Ratios of Nine Sogoshosha, 1978190
Firm Total Debt EquitY Debt-Equity
Mitsubishi 1,379 159 8.7
Mitsui 1,694 159 10.7
C. Itoh 1,071 70 15.3
Marubeni 1,067 84 12.7
Sumitomo 587 64 9.2
Nissho-Iwai 628 50 12.6
Tomen 469 30 15.6
Kanematsu 356 23 15.5
Nichimen 296 25 11.8
In comparison, the debt/equity ratios of American companies average
between 1.0 and 2.0.' g l This debt carried by the sogoshosha takes two
major forms: short- and long-term loans and trade credit. 92
The short-term loans account for about 40% of the total debt of the
sogoshosha.93 These loans, which fall due within one year, are perpet-
ually rolled over by bank creditors and thus are equivalent to long-
term loans with lower short-term interest rates.' 94 Long-term loans
comprise 27% of sogoshosha debt. 195 The interest payments on loans
extended to the trading companies often exceed their operating profit.
For example, in the second half of 1971, the net operating profit of the
sogoshosha was 98 billion yen.196 Total interest paid by the sogoshosha
on their loans, however, was 123 billion yen.' 97 The only other form of
debt carried by the sogoshosha, trade credit (credit extended to custom-
189 Id.
190 Table reprinted with permission of the Brookings Institution from Y. TsURUMI & R.
TSURUMI, SOGOSHOSHA: ENGINFS OF EXPORT-BASED GROWTH 10, © 1980 by the Brookings
Institution. Cf. M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 13 (debt/equity ratios average about 15 to 1).
191 See, e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 314-405 (Brudney & Chirelstein
2d. ed. 1979). In America, if the debt/equity ratio exceeds 4.0 the debt may be reclassified as
equity. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
192 M. YOSH1NO, supra note 13, at 12-13.
193 Id. at 13.
194 SOGOSHOOSHA, supra note 3, at 11.





ers), generally is equivalent to three or four months worth of sales.' 98
The tendency of Japanese corporations, especially the sogoshosha,
to borrow heavily is probably the most distinctive feature of corporate
finance in Japan. As seen in Table 5, Japanese corporations borrow
49% of their funds, while American corporations borrow only 12.4%.
Japanese corporations also rely on debt more than corporations in the
United Kingdom, West Germany, and France. Conversely, Japanese
corporations have the lowest rate of internal finance and American cor-
porations have the highest.
Table 5: International Comparison of Corporate Finance, 1966-
1970 (in percentages) 199
Total
Internal Borrowed Securities External
Country Finance Money Issued Finance Total
Japan 40.0 49.0 11.0 60.0 100
United States 69.4 12.4 18.2 30.6 100
United Kingdom 51.4 10.3 38.3 48.6 100
West Germany 63.1 29.6 7.3 38.9 100
France 65.0 27.4 7.6 35.0 100
This unique characteristic of Japanese corporate finance has been
termed "overloan;" it is defined as the condition when central bank
money, less borrowed funds, is negative.200 That is, the banks have
loans and investments funded from sources other than deposits and eq-
uity capital. Thus, reserve assets (the sum of central bank money plus
second-line reserve assets such as call loans, short-term government se-
curities, and commercial bills circulating in the bills discount market,
minus borrowed funds) are consistently negative.20 1 The overloan phe-
nomenon results from considered government policy and derives pri-
marily from direct loans to the city banks by the Bank of Japan.20 2
The prime beneficiaries of this overloan policy are the city banks,
the corporate sector, and the sogoshosha. The city banks' loans and
198 Id. In 1974, the big six extended a total trade credit to suppliers and customers of $7,400
billion, a sum that exceeded the total loans made by the largest Japanese commercial bank by
$2,700 billion. Id.
199 Table reprinted with permission of Yale University Press from Y. SuzUI, MONEY AND
BANKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 14, © 1980 by Yale University Press.
200 y. SuzUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN Co PORARY JAPAN 5 (1980).
201 Id. at 3-8.
202 Id. at 21. Another author has noted that because of the readiness of the Bank of Japan to
give credit to the commercial banks, liquidity has little practical significance in Japanese bank
lending. The Japanese financial managers not only allowed the overloan situation to arise but
also permitted it to continue for long periods of time without fear of panic or insolvency. T.
ADAMs & I. Hosim, supra note 184, at 127.
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investments regularly exceed their deposits and capital, while non-city
banks must restrict their loans and investments to their range of capital
and deposits. Therefore, "the commercial banking system in Japan is
comprised of one group of institutions that are regularly net lenders
and another group that are normally net borrowers, a phenomenon not
generally seen in Europe or the United States. '203 The city banks ex-
ploit this difference and use the funds readily available from the Bank
of Japan to compete aggressively for the business of the sogoshosha,
because the sogoshosha's sheer volume of business transactions makes
them excellent clients.2 04
Conversely, the sogoshosha benefit greatly from this easy credit
market and the eagerness of the city banks to lend money. The
sogoshosha have access to large amounts of capital that they use dis-
criminatingly as trade credit for members of their keiretsu group,
thereby maintaining tighter control of the group.205 The sogoshosha
also use this borrowed money as a source of loans and loan guarantees
for customers and related firms.21
This symbiotic relationship between the city banks and the
sogoshosha-in which the banks have overloaned and the sogoshosha
have overborrowed-prevailed until the mid-1970s. Indeed, one au-
thor has gone so far as to argue that it was "inevitable in the export-
oriented, investment-led rapid growth economy, and the low interest dom-
inated, noninternational financial structure of Japan that overloan and
overborrowing should become inextricably entwined. ' 20 7 With the ad-
vent of the 1970s, however, this relationship began to change. The gov-
ernment and the public acknowledged that the policy of maintaining
sub-equilibrium interest rates that had been designed to promote ex-
203 y. SuzuKi, supra note 200, at 15-16. For an international comparison of overlending in
December 1972, see appendix, Table A-I l.
204 M. YosHINO, supra note 13, at 14. The city banks also pursued sogoshosa business so avidly
because the amount of foreign exchange a bank handled was an important consideration for ob-
taining Ministry of Finance approval to open new foreign branches and offices. Id. Obviously,
the sogoshosha could provide the banks with a great deal of foreign exchange.
The banks are able to hedge their loans in several ways: (1) a corporation borrows from
several banks, with the leading bank carrying less than 30% of the company's debt, (2) the risk of
default is spread widely, and (3) the Bank of Japan would assist a failing company. Caves &
Uekusa, supra note 80, at 480.
205 For example, in fiscal year 1974, the top six sogoshosha extended a total trade credit to
suppliers and customers of $7,400 billion, a sum that exceeded the total loans made by the largest
commercial bank by a margin of $2,700 billion. Although not all of this money went to keiresu
companies, a substantial portion of it did. JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21,
at 17.
206 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 13. Table A-12 in the appendix more clearly shows which
banks lend the money and to which trading companies.
207 y. SuzuKI, supra note 200, at 14 (original emphasis).
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ports and corporate investment had fulfilled its purpose.20 8 This ac-
knowledgement was prompted by the depreciation (in real .terms) of
household savings, by the internationalization of the Japanese money
markets, and by the expansion in size of government debt.20 9-
The most strident clamor for change came from consumers. Be-
cause real interest rates fell below the severe inflation rate that pre-
vailed from 1973 to 1975, the household sector, which was a net lender,
lost money. Yet the corporate sector, which was a net debtor, reaped
huge profits.210 The consumers believed that increased corporate in-
vestment or profit no longer raised personal income and thus the artifi-
cially low interest rates caused an unfair transfer of income from
households to the corporate sector.21
In order to counteract this transfer, the Bureau of Banks of the
Ministry of Finance enacted a plan in December 1974 to limit severely
the amount of money a financial institution could lend to a Japanese
corporation. The plan restricted the loans of commercial banks to 20%
of their equity (jiki shihon), those of long-term credit banks and trust
banks to 30% of equity, and those of foreign exchange banks to 40% of
equity.212 Although sound banking and depositor protection were the
official reasons offered by the Ministry of Finance for the plan, the
sogoshosha were the main target. The plan forced eight trading com-
panies (all of the top ten except Kanematsu Gosho, Ltd., and Nichimen
Co.) to redeem approximately 600 billion yen, or $2,000 million, worth
of bank loans.2"3
Notwithstanding the enormous debt service of the sogoshosha,
they are still profitable, albeit not to the extent of American corpora-
tions. From an average profit-to-sales point of view, the performance
of the trading companies is poor. For the top four sogoshosha, this
ratio is about 0.2%.214 The ratio of profit to total capital employed is
also low. For example, for Mitsubishi it was 0.6% and for Mitsui it was
208 Id. at 236. A recent article stated that this tendency of Japanese corporations to rely pri-
marily on debt as their chief source of funds is changing because, "[fllush from years of booming
sales, and increasingly conscious of costs, some of Japan's premier manufacturers are relying less
on bank borrowings to finance their growth and more on long-term bonds and even common
stock." Kanabayashi, Switch in Way Japan Finns Raise Funds May Threaten Foreign Rivals and




212 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 172.
213 Id. Table A-12 in the Appendix lists the loans that Japanese banks made to the ten general
trading companies, and the amount in excess of the limits imposed by the Ministry of Finance, as
of March 31, 1974.
214 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 15.
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0.5%.215 The reason for these low figures is the very low gross profit
margin made by the trading companies: this margin is seldom over 5%
and in large volume transactions can be as low as 2%.216
The sogo shosha, however, are quite profitable when measured by a
return on equity. In 1971, the average return for the top ten trading
companies was 27%.217 In short, although the sogoshosha make little
on each sale, they compensate through the number of transactions they
conduct-and they are able to handle numerous transactions because
of the capital they easily and extensively borrow from the city banks,
which in turn receive their funds from the Bank of Japan.
2. Bank-Centered Conglomerates. Interlocking Directorates and
Intercorporate Shareholdings
The sogoshosha can carry on their extensive international trade
due in large part to their close affiliation with several major Japanese
commercial banks, which not only own a significant portion of the
stock of the sogoshosha but also extend enormous low-interest loans to
the sogoshosha. An examination of the intricate and mutually benefi-
cial relationship between the sogoshosha and these selected banks
shows that this sogoshosha-commercial bank grouping is the core rela-
tionship underpinning the entire sogoshosha operation. Moreover,
bank participation is essential to successful international trade, at least
as conducted by the Japanese.218
As noted above, the Occupation authorities dissolved the zaibatsu
and divided the sogoshosha into hundreds of independent companies.
When the Occupation officially ended in the spring of 1952, however,
the sogoshosha began to regroup along their former zaibatsu lines be-
cause of feelings of kinship, common loyalties and mutual obligations,
common corporate cultures and experiences, and close business rela-
tions built up during the prewar years.219 The new and unique feature
of this postwar regrouping was the formation of the "bank-centered"
conglomerate group.220
These groups formed in the 1950s and accelerated during the
1960s with the active backing of, and often under pressure from, three




218 While reading this section, it would be useful for the reader to bear in mind that the Export
Trading Company Act allows banks to own 100% of the stock of American trading companies.




Bank, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, and Sanwa Bank. 12 They and other
financial institutions came to play a central role in Japan's postwar de-
velopment because they were exempt from the Occupation's dissolution
order and antitrust law.m Moreover, many firms became very depen-
dent on them because of. (1) their practice of giving preferential loans
to selected firms, (2) the never ending shortage of capital in the rapidly
expanding Japanese economy, and (3) the inability of the stock market
to provide the capital necessary for growth.' 3 This dependence upon
banks as a source of capital led to the highly leveraged capital structure
described above.
The development of the bank-centered groups was also promoted
by the ability of the banks to own stock in non-financial organizations.
Although it was generally illegal in the United States for a bank to hold
stock for its own account in any other corporation which was not a
bank,224 the same is not true in Japan. The Antimonopoly Law as en-
acted in 1949 prohibited companies in financial businesses (banking,
mutual banking, trust, insurance, mutual financing, or securities) from
acquiring or holding more than 5% of the stock of any Japanese com-
pany.2 The law, however, was amended in 1953 to raise the limit to
10%.26 Thus, a Japanese bank can own up to 10% of the stock of any
other Japanese company, including a general trading company.
It is not surprising, given the foregoing, that financial institutions
are the largest shareholders of sogoshosha stock. For example, in 1975,
financial institutions owned 48.47% of Mitsubishi's stock, 61.56% of
Marubeni's stock, and 47.62% of Toyomenka's stock.2 27 What is sur-
prising, though, is that through their ownership interests in the
sogoshosha, the banks are able to control completely thousands of
other firms that are subsidiaries of the sogoshosha. After all, a
sogoshosha is not limited in how much of another corporation's stock it




224 The Glass-Steagall Act generally prohibits a national or member state bank from owning
"any shares of stock of any corporation." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). The Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 generally prohibits a bank holding company from engaging in non-banking activities
or from owning or controlling shares of any company that is not a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). See general&, Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holtng Companies, 92
HARv. L. RaV. 787 (1979).
225 Law No. 54 of 1949, §§ 11(1), 10(2), reprinted in Antitrust Hearings, supra note 132, at 980.
226 Law No. 54 of 1953, § I1(1), reprnted in H. Iyoi, supra note 85, at 153.
227 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 52.
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timonopoly Law prohibiting a stock acquisition that would substan-
tially restrain competition.
Equally surprising is that different banks and insurance companies
within the same keiretsu group can each own up to 10% of a keiretsu
corporation's stock. For example, in 1973, Mitsubishi Bank owned
7.84% of Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsubishi .Trust and Banking owned
3.50%, Meiji Life Insurance (a Mitsubishi keiretau firm) owned 4.82%,
and Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance (another keiretsu firm) owned
7.90%.228 Thus, four Mitsubishi financial institutions owned 24.06% of
the stock of Mitsubishi Corp. Three other Mitsubishi firms owned an-
other 9.62%.229 Table 6 below presents similar data for the big six
sogoshosha.
Table 6: Major Shareholders in Six General Trading Companies




Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance 7.90
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 5.14
Meiji Life Insurance 4.82
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking 3.50
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 2.69
Nippon Yusen 2.43





228 Id. at 54.
229 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries owns 5.14%, Nippon Yusen 2.43% and Mitsubishi Electric
2.05%. Id.
230 Table reprinted by permission of Westview Press from THE SoGo SHosHA: JAPAN'S
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Mitsui Life Insurance
Toyo Trust & Banking








Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance
Nissan Motor
Kobe Bank
Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance
Sumitomo Bank
Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance










Sumitomo Trust & Banking
Nippon Electric










































International Law & Business
Table 6, continued







Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance
Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance
Sanko Steamship








Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance
Kobe Steel
Bank of Tokyo
Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance
Asahi Life Insurance
Nippon Life Insurance



























The intercorporate shareholding data in Table 6, though itself indica-
tive of the power bankcentered groups wield, becomes even more in-
triguing when reviewed in conjunction with the data in Table 7. This
Table matches firms with the groups to which they belong. Although
firms bearing the same name as their sogoshosha are easily identified,
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This data, however, is not indicative of the full extent of intercor-
porate shareholding. At the end of March 1974, the big six held stock
in a total of 5,390 companies, of which 1,848 were listed on the stock
exchanges. 2 They also were the largest shareholders in 1,057 compa-
nies having a combined capitalization of $440 billion and total sales of
$6,250 billion-or about 30% of the parents' combined sales. 3  Over
six hundred of the firms in which the big six held stock were subsidiar-
ies, two-thirds of them in Japan and one-third overseas.' About half
of these subsidiaries were in sales, distribution, or transportation and
about one-third were in a broad range of manufacturing industries.23 5
The sogoshosha maintained control over these subsidiaries by control-
ling their sources of supply. Thus, 43% of the subsidiaries owned by
the big six depended on their parent companies for both supplies of raw
and other materials and sales of their finished products, while 40% of
these subsidiaries relied on the parent firms for either supplies or sales
of manufactured products. 6
In sum, intercorporate shareholding is as distinctive a feature of
the Japanese corporate scene--especially among the bank-centered
groups-as their characteristically large debt/equity ratios. Several
banks and other related financial institutions may each own up to 10%
of a sogoshosha's stock and, through this ownership of the "control
block" of stock, control the sogoshosha. In turn, the sogoshosha may
own up to 100% of the stock of hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of
other corporations. The sogoshosha will then borrow huge amounts of
money from its stock-holding group of financial institutions and relend
this money to, or use it as a trade credit for, the firms in which it has an
interest. In return, the customer or related firm will give the
sogoshosha equity ownership, finished goods, or both. And the bank,
through its control of a given sogoshosha, will wield significant influ-
ence over the customers and related firms of the given sogoshosha.
IV. PROBLEMS iN THE 1970s: THE SOGOSHOSHA RESPONSE
As the 1970s unfolded, the general trading companies faced sev-
eral new problems. The traditional strength of the sogoshosha resided
in their ability to manage large scale transactions involving highly stan-
dardized goods for which price was the primary consideration.? Be-
232 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 17.
233 Id.
234 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 46.
235 Id.
2 3 6 Id.
237 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRIsEs, supra note 21, at 18.
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cause their experience had been largely in the area of basic
commodities, they had little experience in handling technological prod-
ucts2 38 and they were ill-equipped to provide marketing or technical
services.2 39 In fact, the sogoshosha typically relied on local wholesalers
within a foreign market and seldom involved themselves beyond the
level of primary wholesalers. 24°
New consumer goods, however, required intensive marketing and
back-up service organizations, both of which the sogoshosha lacked.
To mitigate these weaknesses, manufacturers of highly technical and
complex goods (electronics, cars, heavy machinery, and precision in-
struments), which were and to a large degree still are the more attrac-
tive growth products, undertook their own marketing activities at home
and abroad.24' Sony is the best known example of an electronics firm
that has succeeded without the aid of the sogoshosha.242 Moreover,
even those manufacturers who had relied on the export expertise of the
sogoshosha were able to assume the bulk of their export marketing op-
erations as they became larger and more sophisticated. 43 In short, the
sogoshosha were losing customers.
The trading companies faced another threat from within. By the
early to mid-1970s they had learned that their initial strategy of estab-
lishing small joint ventures in defense of the export market2 " was en-
dangered. The early advantages of the joint ventures had eroded
quickly, and to recapture their competitive advantages, the sogoshosha
began to pursue new strategies, including adding new products,
stressing product differentiation, seeking vertical integration, entering
into cooperative arrangements with rivals, and seeking system-wide
benefits through building an integrated logistical program.4 5 As the
238 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 16.
239 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 18.
240 Id.
241 M. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 16.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 17. Large-scale trading in standardized products required no real understanding by
sogoshosha personnel of the customs of the host countries, and the personnel seldom dealt with
anyone except primary wholesalers. Manufacturers, on the other hand, developed deeper knowl-
edge, greater expertise, and better local contacts as they became more involved in foreign manu-
facturing activities. JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 111.
244 Confronted with the choice of either setting up customer service networks with or for Japa-
nese manufacturers, or of being reduced to handling low-technology products and bulky commod-
ities, the sogoshosha tried to combine their financial and marketing strength with the technical
expertise of manufacturing firms by involving themselves in sales subsidiaries in the industrialized
countries. In this way, they dealt with the newer consumer and industrial products that Japanese
manufacturing industries began exporting in increasing quantities after the mid-1960s. THE JAPA-
NESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 144.
245 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 110.
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subsidiaries began to follow these strategies, the influence of the
sogoshosha declined further because the manufacturing enterprises
controlled most of the skills-product knowledge, knowledge of manu-
facturing technologies, and marketing know-how-necessary to imple-
ment them.' 6 As a result, the sogoshosha continued to lose customers.
The sogoshosha's response to these problems, though different in
degree, usually entailed five common policies. The first was to shift
from small scale joint ventures to large scale projects involving petro-
leum, petrochemicals, and aluminum refining.24 7 The trading compa-
nies are uniquely suited to these types of projects because of their close
connections to manufacturing firms and financial institutions, their ca-
pacity to implement large scale foreign projects, their ability to amass
large amounts of capital, and their international commercial net-
works." 8 The sogoshosha benefit greatly from. these large-scale
projects because they not only provide the various types of equipment
and other supplies necessary for the project, but they then have an al-
most captive source of supply for the commodity produced.
The second strategy of the sogoshosha was to strengthen their mul-
tinational commercial networks in order to facilitate trade among their
foreign units in markets outside Japan.249 To enhance their "third
country trade," the sogoshosha took the unprecedented step of ap-
pointing executive vice-presidents to head major foreign operations
and granting these personnel increased autonomy.5 Another impor-
tant action was to expand the financial resources of these major over-
seas affiliates. For example, Mitsubishi increased the capital stock of
Mitsubishi International Corp. by $50 million*between 1974 and 1976;
Mitsui raised the capital stock of Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., from $65
million to $133 million during the same period; and C. Itoh & Co.
(America), Inc., had its capital stock boosted $52 million from 1973 to
1976.51 Thus, the capital stock of the American affiliates of the big ten
either equaled or exceeded that of the head offices in Japan.25 2
246 Id.
247 Id. at 114.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 115. One author contends that (1) it is this third-country trade that marks the differ-
ence between a multinational corporation and the sogoshosha, and (2) this type of business has
been the most important single specific target of all sogoshosha since the early 1970s. A. YouNG,
supra note 22, at 197. The third-country trade of the sogoshosha has increased from just $35
million in 1956 to $15.4 billion in 1976. Id. at 197-202. This third-country trade by the
sogoshosha exceeds the total foreign trade of the People's Republic of China. Id. at 202.
250 A. YouNG, supra note 22, at 188-91.
251 Id. at 189.
2 5 2 Id.
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The third policy was to seek vertical integration on a global
scale.253 One facet of this policy was to establish specialized supply,
distribution, and project bases in order to achieve global sourcing and
marketing.254 These international procurement and service corpora-
tions collect information, secure orders, and procure materials and
equipment for their customers from the entire world.2" Another facet
was to link upstream and downstream operations within key industries
worldwide. For example, Mitsui purchased a 50% interest in American;
Metal Climax, thus gaining access to bauxite reserves in Australia and
refining facilities in America and elsewhere. 256 To secure volume
purchases of foods abroad, the sogoshosha have purchased warehouses,
grain elevators, and cold storage plants in key purchasing bases."
The fourth step taken by the sogoshosha was to strengthen and
diversify their operations in key markets.25 Thus, the trading compa-
nies expanded the number of host country incorporated subsidiaries25 9
and encouraged them to diversify their operations beyond large scale
trading in standardized products.2 60 To achieve this diversification, the
sogoshosha have begun marketing products under their own brand
names through their newly established foreign sales subsidiaries. One
example is C. Itoh & Co., which established C. Itoh Electronics, Inc., in
1973 in Los Angeles, and which was to begin marketing personal and
office computers in the United States under its own brand name in
1982.261
The final policy implemented by the sogoshosha was to revamp
their Overseas Enterprise Departments (OEDs). During their postwar
development, the trading companies allowed each division of the com-
pany to make foreign investment decisions; the managers within these
product divisions had almost unlimited autonomy in deciding where
and when to commit funds to foreign operations that were designed
and established to defend export markets or to effect large sales of ma-
chinery or equipment. Because many of these decisions were poorly
253 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 115.
254 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 189.
255 Id. at 190.
256 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 21, at 115-16.
257 THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 145-46. Mitsui & Co. bought eight United
States grain elevators in 1978 upon 48-hour notice, and the other trading companies are not far
behind. Wall St. J., July 31, 1981, at 40, col 2.
258 THE JAPANESE ARE COMING, supra note 51, at 116.
259 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 189.
260 JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, smpra note 21, at 116.
261 Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Aug. 10, 1981, at 6, col 4. The annual sales of this subsidiary
have already reached $189 million. Id.
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planned, however, they were often unprofitable.262 Thus, the
sogoshosha established OEDs.
Initially, the OEDs' involvement with new overseas investments
was limited to preparing an investment proposal after the division had
decided to make an investment.263 To this end, the OEDs prepared
routine financial analyses and pro forma statements, checked the credit
of proposed local partners, submitted appropriate documents to the
governments concerned, drafted joint venture contracts, and initiated
the routine intrafirm procedure for formal approval of the invest-
ment.2" Gradually, the OEDs realized that the only way to ensure a
substantive role in the initial investment decision itself was to make
themselves invaluable through project analyses and feasibility studies.
Thus, they honed their planning and analytical skills and eventually
persuaded either the product divisions or top management to establish
committees to screen new foreign investments 65 The end result was
that the OEDs, having standardized their data collection procedures
and having proven the need for their project analyses and feasibility
studies, assumed a central role in foreign investment decisions. Indeed,
the reports prepared by the OEDs were welcomed by the governments
of host countries and relied upon by foreign partners in preparing their
own proposals.' In this way, the sogoshosha were able to consolidate
their foreign investment decisions and make them more profitable.
V. PROSPECTS FOR THE SOGOSHOSHA
Although the sogoshosha have grown enormously in the past thirty
years, several authors have reservations about the ability of the
sogoshosha to maintain, much less increase, their level of sales. Two
basic reasons explain these reservations. First, the traditional strength
of the sogoshosha was the scale on which they could procure and dis-
tribute goods. As the Japanese industrial structure shifted, however,
from textiles and standard goods to capital-intensive goods such as
steel, chemicals, oil, and petrochemicals, the type of marketing struc-
ture also shifted. These newer types of exports require technical serv-
ices, extensive marketing efforts, and after-sales service. The trading
companies, though, lack the ability to provide these services2 6 7 and, as
a result, more and more manufacturers who formerly used the
262 JAPAN'S MULTNATiONAL ENTFRPimSES, Jupra note 21, at 99-103.
263 .d. at 103.
2 6 4 Id.
265 .d. at 103-04.
266 Id. at 104.
267 Id. at 118-19.
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sogoshosha are now buying their own supplies directly and marketing
their own products independently.268
The sogoshosha have reacted to this problem with different de-
grees of rapidity and intensity, but the basic reaction of all has been to
integrate their operations. In doing so, they have followed six closely
interrelated business strategies: growth, diversification, creation of sup-
ply and demand, organization and coordination of new growth indus-
tries, consumer market penetration, and consolidation of affiliates. The
expansion of C. Itoh & Co. into the United States computer market
through a local subsidiary and the consolidation by Mitsui & Co. of its
twenty-eight affiliated corporations--discussed above -are but two
examples.2zT
The second reason for reservations about the future of the
sogoshosha is, according to at least one author, their inability to pro-
duce more Japanese managers culturally and socially comfortable in
foreign languages, customs, and manners.2 7 1 Because the overseas ac-
tivities of the sogoshosha have become extensive, Japanese expatriate
managers and their local clerical staff are increasingly unable to handle
all the work. Moreover, to penetrate overseas markets more deeply, the
trading companies need local experts well-versed in the "ins and outs"
of local business and politics-an area in which Japanese expatriates
are at a distinct disadvantage.272
Mitsubishi International Corp., the United States subsidiary of
Mitsubishi Corp., is the only sogoshosha that has made a serious effort
to remedy this shortcoming. By the spring of 1979, it had made formal
attempts at retraining both its Japanese and American managers in or-
268 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 100.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 160 and 261.
270 Useful examples of some of the activities are: (1) growth-introduction of three-year eco-
nomic programs based upon macroeconomic indices, the economic plans of major customers, and
internal sogoshosha data on past performance; (2) diversification-establishment of sales compa-
nies to handle specialized products and acquisition of smaller trading companies (senmonshosha);
(3) creation of supply and demand-achieving both upstream and downstream integration in the
same industry or product line; (4) organization and coordination of new growth industries--or-
ganizing large complex projects such as natural resource development or urban and regional de-
velopment (5) consumer market penetration-expansion into the consumer food industry (by
purchasing chicken and pig farms, the products of which go to group firms for processing, packag-
ing, distribution, and retail sale), or by entering into joint ventures with foreign firms seeking to
enter Japan (e.g., Mitsubishi and Kentucky Fried Chicken (1970) or Marubeni and Dairy Queen
(1973)); (6) consolidation of affiliates-the merger of Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries, New
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Engineering into Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries. A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 106-17.
271 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 57.
272 Id. at 55.
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der to integrate the latter more fully into the company.273 Efforts such
as this one are essential to the continued success of the sogoshosha be-
cause they will be unable to exploit fully their key strength-economies
of scale in communications and organization-unless foreign managers
are integrated into the operation.274 Furthermore, these foreign man-
agers will probably be dissatisfied and unwilling or unable to devote all
their time and capabilities to their jobs until they are integrated. After
all, the sogoshosha's organizational strength is based on informal but
substantive cooperation among professionals who share the values and
goals of the firm.275 And the foreign managers, who are becoming in-
creasingly important in the overseas operations of the sogoshosha, will
not share these values and goals unless they are socialized in the "cor-
porate style" (shafu) and integrated into the company's mainstream
activities.
Although the foregoing reservations apply in varying degrees to all
of the sogoshosha, there is little doubt that they are, and will continue
to be in the forseeable future, engines of export-based growth. They
have taken concrete steps to move into new consumer markets and
handle goods that complement or replace standardized, less complex
ones now being manufactured more cheaply in Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Korea.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
TRADING COMPANIES
The concern of American business and the United States govern-
ment over the ability of American industry to export its products at
levels sufficient to balance United States imports-if not to provide a
basis for positive growth-greatly contributed to enactment of the Ex-
port Trading Company Act of 1982.276 In title I of the Act, Congress
specifically found, inter alia, that although exports are vital to main-
taining American jobs, trade deficits contribute to inflation, and that
although America has many exportable products, especially in the agri-
cultural sector, "export trade services in the United States are frag-
mented into a multitude of separate functions, and companies
attempting to offer export trade services lack financial leverage to reach
a significant number of potential United States exporters.""27 Thus, the
273 Id. at 57.
274 Id. at 55.
275 Id.
276 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102(a), 96 Stat. 1233, 1234 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4001).
277 Id. § 102(a)(6), 96 Stat. 1233, 1234 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4001).
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purpose of the Act is to increase United States exports by providing
more efficient export services through the use of export trading compa-
nies (ETCs) and by permitting bank holding companies, bankers'
banks, and Edge Act corporations to invest in ETCs.278 In short, Con-
gress has amended the antitrust and banking laws to allow financial
institutions to own stock in and make loans to American trading com-
panies and to grant these trading companies a limited exemption from
the operation of the American antitrust laws, all to increase American
exports.
A. Revision of American Antitrust Laws
Although two different titles within the Export Trading Compa-
nies Act have a direct and substantial impact on United States antitrust
laws, as a practical matter one of them may render the other
unnecessary.
1. Limitation of Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commission
Act Applicability
Title IV of the Export Trading Companies Act is itself called the
"Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, ' '279 and it has
amended both the Sherman Act"' 0 and the Federal Trade Commission
Act.28  These amendments will create sweeping changes in antitrust
enforcement in international trade.28 2 The amendments' practical ef-
fect is to exempt export trade from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act
against monopolistic practices and the prohibition of the Federal Trade
Commission Act against unfair methods of competition, unless the ex-
empted activity has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably forseeable
278 Id. § 102(b), 96 Stat. 1233, 1234 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4001).
279 Id. § 401, 96 Stat. at 1246 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
280 15 U.S.C. § 1 el seq. (1976), as amended by Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra
note 276, § 402, 96 Stat. at 1246 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
281 15 U.S.C. § 45a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Export Trading Company Act of
1982, supra note 276, § 403, 96 Stat. at 1246 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
282 The text of the amendments is as follows:
SEC. 402. The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 6
the following new section:
"SEC. 7. This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
"(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably forseeable effect-
"(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on
import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
"(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in
such trade or commerce in the United States; and




effect" on domestic trade or commerce.283
Although it can be argued that the "reasonably foreseeable effect"
language is simply a codification of pre-existing case law,284 the re-
quired finding of a "direct" and "substantial" effect, nonetheless, will
alter the conduct of antitrust cases involving export trade. Moreover,
the requirement of a finding of "reasonably forseeable effect" arguably
will allow courts less leeway to infer intent from the defendant's ac-
tions. A further analysis of the effect which these required findings will
have on United States antitrust litigation is beyond the scope of this
article, but no doubt numerous legal articles will be forthcoming. 85 In
any case, several practitioners have predicted that the presence of title
IV will discourage companies from seeking certification as an ETC be-
cause ETC certification poses problems that might outweigh its
benefits.u86
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then
this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States."
SEc. 403. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving com-
merce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless-
"(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect-
"(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce
with foreign nations; or
"(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce
in the United States; and
"(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, other than
this paragraph.
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of
subparagraph (A)(iO, this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States."
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, §§ 402-403, 96 Stat. at 1246-47 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
283 Id.
284 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (a finding of specific intent is unnec-
essary; if a restraint occurring as a result of the defendant's conduct is sufficient); International
Org., United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. International Org., United Mine Workers v. Carbon Fuel Co., 275 U.S. 536
(1927) (questions of willful purpose or conscious design are unnecessary because persons combin-
ing or contracting are presumed to have intended the necessary and natural consequences of their
acts and agreements).
285 Indeed, the passage of the Export Trading Company Act has already generated several
articles. Eg., Moore, Late Addition May Prove to be Key to Export Act, Legal Times, Oct. 11,
1982, at 1, col. 3-4; Farnsworth, Trade Billis Expected to Spur Exports, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1982,
at 3 1, col. 1-4. See also Export Trading Companies: A4 New Toolfor American Business, Business
America, Oct. 18, 1982, at 1-14 (Business America is a newsletter published by the United States
Department of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as ETCs, A New Tool].
286 Moore, supra note 285, at 1, col. 3-4. For example, certification subjects the ETC to liability
for reimportation. Id.
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2. Certpcate of Review Limitation of Antitrust Liability
and Damages
Title III of the Act is entitled "Export Trade Certificates of Re-
view," and its basic purpose is to limit the antitrust liability of entities
possessing a certificate of review. Section 306 details the protection
conferred by a certificate of review and provides, in pertinent part, that:
(1) no civil or criminal action will lie against a certificate-holder for
conduct which is specified in and complies with the terms of the
holder's certificate; (2) any person suing for relief from the activities of
a certificate-holder is limited to actual damages (rather than treble
damages), plus injunctive relief, interest on actual damages, cost of suit,
and reasonable attorneys' fees; (3) suit must be commenced within two
years of notice of the damage and in any event within four years of its
occurrence; (4) a rebuttable presumption exists that a certificate-
holder's activity, as specified in the certificate, does not have an an-
ticompetitive effect; and (5) a successful certificate-holder can recover
attorneys' fees and costs of suit.
28 7
To obtain a certificate of review, an applicant must demonstrate to
the Secretary of Commerce that the applicant's specified export
trade,288 export trade activities, 289 and methods of operation29 ° will, in
287 The actual language of Section 306 is as follows:
SEc. 306. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no criminal or civil action may be
brought under the antitrust laws against a person to whom a certificate of review is issued
which is based on conduct which is specified in, and complies with the terms of, a certificate
issued under section 303 which certificate was in effect when the conduct occurred.
(b)(1) Any person who has been injured as a result of conduct engaged in under a
certificate of review may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, actual damages, the loss of
interest on actual damages, and the cost of suit (including a reasonable attorney's fee) for the
failure to comply with the standards of section 303(a). Any action commenced under this title
shall proceed as if it were an action commenced under section 4 or section 16 of the Clayton
Act, except that the standards of section 303(a) of this title and the remedies provided in this
paragraph shall be the exclusive standards and remedies applicable to such action.
(2) Any action brought under paragraph (1) shall be filed within two years of the date
the plaintiff has notice of the failure to comply with the standards of section 303(a) but in any
event within four years after the cause of action accrues.
(3) In any action brought under paragraph (1), there shall be a presumption that con-
duct which is specified in and complies with a certificate of review does comply with the
standards of section 303(a).
(4) In any action brought under paragraph (1), if the court finds that the conduct does
comply with the standards of section 303(a), the court shall award to the person against whom
the claim is brought the cost of suit attributable to defending against the claim (including a
reasonable attorney's fee).
(5) The Attorney General may file suit pursuant to section 15 of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 25) to enjoin conduct threatening clear and irreparable harm to the national interest.
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 306, 96 Stat. at 1243 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 4016).
288 Section 311(1) of the Export Trading Company Act states that "the term 'export trade'
means trade or commerce in goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported, or in the course of
being exported, from the United States or any territory thereof to any foreign nation."
Id. § 311(1), 96 Stat. at 1245 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §4021).
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essence, have no anticompetitive effect in the United States and will not
result in resale of the applicant's goods or services in the United
States. 291 Within ninety days of receipt of an application, the Secretary
is required to evaluate the potential for anticompetitive effects or re-
sale, and if no anticompetitive effects or likelihood of resale exist, the
Secretary, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, will issue a
certificate of review to the applicant specifying the export trade, export
trade activities, and methods of operation to which the certificate ap-
plies.292 An applicant or any other aggrieved person has a right to judi-
cial review of the Secretary's grant or denial, whether in whole or in
part, of a certificate.293
Other, less important provisions of title III state that the Secretary,
with the Attorney General's concurrence, may issue guidelines about
the application of the antitrust laws to export trade.294 In addition, a
certificate holder must file an annual report with the Secretary.295 Fi-
nally, any information submitted by any person in connection with the
issuance, amendment, or revocation of a certificate is generally exempt
from the public disclosure which is required of executive agencies.296
A review of the foregoing provisions' potential effect on the establish-
ment and operation of American ETCs follows.
B. Revision of American Banking Laws
The Export Trading Company Act made provision for bank own-
ership and involvement in ETCs primarily by amending297 the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956.298 The pertinent definitions are con-
tained in title I of the Export Trading Company Act.29 9 General provi-
sions and operative provisions are found in title II, called the "Bank
289 Section 311(3) of the Export Trading Company Act states that "the term 'export trade activ-
ities' means activities or agreements in the course of export trade." Id. § 311(3), 96 Stat. at 1245
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4021).
290 Section 311(4) of the Export Trading Company Act states that "the term 'methods of opera-
tion' means any method by which a person conducts or proposes to conduct export trade."
d. § 311(4), 96 Stat. at 1245 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4021).
291 Id. § 303(a), 96 Stat. at 1241 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4013).
292 Id. § 303(b), 96 Stat. at 1241 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4013).
293 Id. § 305(a), 96 Stat. at 1243 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4015).
294 Id. § 307(a), 96 Stat. at 1244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4017).
295 Id. § 308, 96 Stat. at 1244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4018).
296 Id. § 309(a), 96 Stat. at 1244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4019).
297 Id. § 203, 96 Stat. at 1236 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
298 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Export Trading Company
Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 203, 96 Stat. at 1236 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
299 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 103, 96 Stat. at 1234 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 4002). The reader should be aware that there are two sets of definitions in the ETC
Act, those in section 103, which apply to bank export services (i.e., title II), and those in section
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Export Services Act."3 °
An ETC is defined as a company doing business in the United
Statesprincoialy for the purpose of exporting goods and services pro-
duced in the United States. and assisting unrelated companies to export
their products overseas.3°' An ETC can either export goods and serv-
ices for its own account or provide facilitating services for unrelated
exporters, but cannot do both.30 2 Even though an ETC is a company
"principally" engaged in exporting, it can engage in importing and
trade with third countries. Moreover, the Act permits foreign owner-
ship of ETCs. 3 3
Bank holding companies304 and bankers' banks may invest up to
5% and loan up to 10% of their consolidated capital surplus in an
ETC.305 They may also own up to 100% of the stock of an ETC, and
the ETC may have the same name as its bank organization parent.0 6
Although the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) must approve any invest-
ment, an investor company simply needs to notify the FRB of the in-
tended investment and, if the FRB fails to object within sixty days, the
bank may proceed with the intended investment.307 Finally, it should
be noted that a bank is exempted from the collateral requirements in
the Federal Reserve Act for loans to its ETC.30 8
311, which apply to export trade certificates of review (i.e., title III). See id. §§ 103, 311, 96 Stat. at
1234, 1245 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1234, 1245).
300 Id. § 201, 96 Stat. at 1235.
301 Id. § 103(4), 96 Stat. at 1234 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4002). This section states that:
the term "export trading company" means a person, partnership, association, or similar or-
ganization, whether operated for profit or as a nonprofit organization, which does business
under the laws of the United States or any State and which is organized and operated princi-
pally for purposes of-
(A) exporting goods or services produced in the United States; or
(B) facilitating the exportation of goods or services produced in the United States by
unaffiliated persons by providing one or more export trade services. ....
302 Id See also ETCs, A New Tool, supra note 285, at 5.
303 ETCs, A New Tool, supra note 285, at 5.
304 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 1841, in essence, defines a bank hold-
ing company as a company that owns or controls, either directly or indirectly, a bank or another
bank holding company. In addition to its normal meaning, "control" also is deemed to include
ownership or voting control of 25% or more of the voting securities of a bank or bank holding
company.
305 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 203, 96 Stat. at 1236 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
306 H.R. REP. No. 294, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Conference Report on S.734, Export TradingAct
of 1982, and Conferees' Explanatory Statement on Bill), reprinted in 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) 719, 724 (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
307 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 203(3), 96 Stat. at 1236 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
308 Id. Other provisions of title II, although interesting, are largely unrelated to this article;
they cover such problems as export-import guarantees of loans to ETCs, id. § 206, 96 Stat. at
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This revision of the United States banking laws should make
available to ETCs the financial support and international trade experi-
ence that have helped make the sogoshosha successful. As we have
seen, city banks are the main source of capital for the sogoshosha, both
through stock ownership and the extension of loans. For example, in
1973 Mitsubishi Bank owned 7.84% of the stock in Mitsubishi Corp.3 °9
and provided 14.8% of its loans.31 0 In short, Mitsubishi's main bank
provided 22.64% of its total funds in 1973. C. Itoh & Co. is an even
more interesting example, in that two main banks accounted for 41.24%
of its loans and equity; Sumitomo Bank owned 8.72% of its stock and
held 12.9% of its debt, while Daiichi-Kangyo Bank also owned 8.72%
of its stock and held 10.9% of its debt.3t1 In total, the Sumitomo Bank
group and the Daiichi-Kangyo Bank group accounted for 50.04% of C.
Itoh's equity and debt.31z
Similar ownership patterns are not impossible for American ETCs,
because under the Act a bank holding company may own an ETC com-
pletely. The only limitations on such ownership are that: (1) the in-
vestment by a bank holding company in the stock of an ETC not
exceed 5% of the bank holding company's consolidated capital and sur-
plus, and (2) the total extensions of credit by a bank holding company
to an ETC at any one time not exceed 10% of the bank holding com-
pany's consolidated capital and surplus. 313 The Act specifically pro-
vides that "an extension of credit shall not be deemed to include any
amount invested by a bank holding company in the shares of an export
trading company." 31
4
As we have seen, the ability of the sogoshosha to export goods suc-
cessfully is closely tied to the amount of funds they have to loan to their
related firms and customers and that they can use to integrate the vari-
ous operations involved in exportation. The Export Trading Company
Act will allow ETCs to receive significant amounts of their funds from
banking organizations. It also ensures that banks will be able to par-
ticipate in ETCs and thus make available to ETCs the knowledge and
facilities which the banks have developed in their international dal-
ings. Thus, the ETCs should have the financial ability, trained person-
§ 1239 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635a-4) and bank acceptance of ETC drafts or bills of ex-
change, id. § 207, 96 Stat. at 1239 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 372 (1976)).
309 A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 54.
310 Id. at 43.
311 Id. at 43, 54.
312 Id.
313 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, § 203(3), 96 Stat. at 1236 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
314 Id.
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nel, and physical presence necessary to compete efficiently with the
sogoshosha and to export American products in large quantities.
C. Competitive Limitations on American Export
Trading Companies
Although the Export Trading Company Act should help signifi-
cantly to increase United States exports-assuming, of course, that
American industry and agriculture take advantage of export markets
and the presence of ETCs-several structural and operational differ-
ences will exist between American and Japanese trading companies.
These differences could have an enormous impact upon the success of
American export trading companies.
The most bothersome problem is that, although all export trade
organizations, whether they have the statutory certificate of review or
not, will enjoy a limited exemption from the operation of the Sherman
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, the exemption may be
construed by the Department of Commerce, the Attorney General, or
the courts to apply only to export trade activities. As previously ex-
plained, however, one of the three major functions of an international
trading company is to minimize the risk in international trade of fluctu-
ations in demand and fluctuations in exchange rates. One method by
which the sogoshosha accomplish the latter is to "marry" the exporta-
tion of goods from Japan under one contract with the importation of
goods from abroad under a different contract. 15 They thereby limit
transactions across different currencies to minimal levels and thus re-
duce the risk of fluctuations in exchange rates. In other words, to mini-
mize the risk of exchange rate fluctuations, the sogoshosha must engage
in both export and import activity. And, it is not always possible for
them to keep exports above imports because international demand
rates change continuously and because changes in exchange rates may
at times require imports greater than exports. Thus, during the period
1963 to 1972, for example, the sogoshosha imported 62-65% of all Japa-
nese imports and exported 47-52% of all Japanese exports.3 16 In no
year during this period, however, did the exports of the sogoshosha ex-
ceed their imports. 3
17
Neither the certificate of review procedure set forth in title III nor
315 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
316 Krause & Sekiguci, supra note 28, at 392.
317 By fiscal year 1976, the export to import ratio had improved. In that year only two of the
big ten had imports exceeding exports, and exports amounted to 21.3% of their sales while imports
amounted to 20.9%. A. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 29. For a breakdown of this data by sogoshosha,




the limited antitrust exemption for export trade set forth in title IV es-
tablishes clear guidelines for ETCs with certificates of review or export
trade organizations lacking such certificates to determine the amount of
import trade in which they can engage without losing their antitrust
exemption. This uncertainty within the Export Trading Company Act
will hamper seriously the ability of such companies to "marry" their
transactions and thereby reduce the risk of exchange rate fluctuations.
Their overall effectiveness may thus be hindered from the start.318
ETCs must deal with the inevitable fluctuations in international
demand and in foreign exchange rates by- engaging in varying levels of
import activity so as to maximize their effectiveness. Therefore, the
Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General, in drafting the vari-
ous guidelines, rules, and regulations called for by the Export Trading
Company Act,319 should pay particular attention to the need to balance
domestic antitrust concerns with the need of ETCs to engage in both
import and export trade.
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the government and the
courts in determining whether the activities of a certificate-holding
ETC have a domestic anticompetitive effect, in violation of the four
antitrust standards of section 303(a) of the Act, 2' is factoring into the
318 The experience of the Japanese sogoshosha in this area, however, may be inapplicable to
"American sogoshosha" and requires the following qualification. Japan is woefully lacking in
natural resources and the raw materials necessary for the construction of finished products.
Therefore, she must import vast amounts of raw materials that are processed and then used in the
industrial process. The sogoshosha play a key role in importing these raw materials and then
exporting the finished products manufactured therefrom.
In contrast, America has an abundance of raw materials and is able to manufacture many of
her finished goods largely from domestic sources. Thus, it may be necessary for American trading
companies or their client firms to import more than 50% of the fair market value of the finished
goods eventually exported by them.
319 Under section 307 the Secretary of Commerce may, with the concurrence of the Attorney
General, draft guidelines regarding the application of the antitrust laws to export trade. Export
Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, 96 Stat. at 1244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4017). Section 310 requires the Secretary, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to
promulgate any rules or regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. Id.
320 The certificate of review is issued to any applicant that has established that its specified
export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation wilh
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade within
the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export trade of any competitor of the
applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the United States of
the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the
export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include .any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the sale for con-
sumption or resale within the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services
exported by the applicant.
Id. § 310, 96 Stat. at 1245 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4020). § 303(a), 96 Stat. at 1241 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4013).
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decision-making processes the very competition from the Japanese
sogoshosha and their counterparts in China, Korea, and Brazil that
spurred the development of the Export Trading Company Act.321 Ar-
guably it is the very existence and operation of the sogoshosha which,
having contributed to the necessity for development of American
ETCs, will operate to prevent the formation of American monopolies
and the imposition of anticompetitive and monopolistic practices upon
American consumers. In other words, it is the competition from the
sogoshosha and their foreign counterparts within the American market
that has hurt the American trade balance and that thus encouraged
passage of the Export Trading Company Act. In their various activi-
ties, the American ETCs' challenge is to contend with the competition
that helped foster their creation. The process of determining whether
the export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation of an
ETC substantially lessen competition, restrain trade, or unreasonably
affect prices within the United States, therefore, necessarily requires an
evaluation of sogoshosha activity within the United States in the same
relevant product market areas as the export trade activity under
evaluation.
The same problem of determining how much import activity an
ETC can engage in without running afoul of the Act plagues title II,
which covers bank investment in ETCs. The definition of an export
trading company, regardless of whether it is the section 103(a)(4) or
section 203(3)(F)(i) definition, states that an ETC must be "organized
and operated principally for the purposes of exporting goods or services
produced in the United States or facilitating the exportation of goods
or services produced in the United States by unaffiliated persons.""
Nowhere in the Act, however, is the word "principally" defined.
Presumably, the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of
the Attorney General, will clarify this deficiency in the guidelines,
rules, and regulations mentioned above. Given the need of ETCs both
to import and to export, however, it would probably be best if the Sec-
retary's pronouncements adopt a flexible approach, rather than simply
declare that ETCs must generate more than 50% of their annual reve-
nues from export activities. One possible method by which the Secre-
tary could help ensure the success of the ETCs, thereby promoting the
purposes of the Act, while at the same time making sure that ETCs are
principally engaged in export trade as required by the Act, would be to
321 See infra text accompanying notes 323-26.
322 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 276, §§ 103(a)(4), 203 (3), 96 Stat. at
1234, 1236 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4002, 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
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draft regulations imposing a specific limitation on the number of years
in a given period during which an ETC could have imports in excess of
exports. For example, the regulations could require an ETC to main-
tain exports greater than imports on a rolling five-year basis. This ap-
proach would give ETCs greater flexibility in "marrying" their export
trade to import trade and thereby increase the ability of the ETCs to
minimize the risks of international trade.
A similar result could be reached by requiring an ETC to have
average exports greater than average imports during a given period of,
perhaps, three, four, or five years. In this way, the ETC would be able
to take advantage of any unexpected drop in prices for large quantities
of component raw materials found abroad late one year and incorpo-
rated into a finished product that would be exported early the following
year. Thus, not only would the trading company be able to minimize
the fluctuations in exchange rates, it would also be able to effect econo-
mies of scale-another crucial function of an export trading company.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Export Trading Company Act should provide American busi-
ness with the apparatus necessary to export its goods more aggressively,
easily, and cheaply. No longer will small- and medium-size firms be
forced to confine their sales to the domestic market, for the ETCs
should provide the same type of funding, expertise, and facilities that
have made Japan the second largest economy in the world and that
have allowed Japan consistently to post a trade surplus. The only seri-
ous impediment is that the ETCs may constantly have to maintain ex-
ports above imports. This may not be possible given the risks of
fluctuation in both international demand and international exchange
rates with which the ETCs must cope.
Despite these limitations, the ETCs now have a framework that
should allow them to minimize these risks, to reduce transaction costs
by taking advantage of economies of scale, and to make efficient use of
capital because of the preceding two functions. The ETCs will also be
positioned to benefit greatly from the Japanese experience-they will
know how successful trading companies such as the sogoshosha are or-
ganized, how they have handled shifting patterns in international trade,
and how they have expanded their operations. If the American ETCs
can build on the Japanese experience, American business may not re-
gret that it has sold large amounts of technological knowledge to Japan,
which Japan has improved upon and marketed throughout the world.
Given the undeniable success of the sogoshosha in exporting Japa-
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nese goods worldwide on a massive scale, thereby allowing Japan to
maintain an enormous trade surplus, it is possible that American trad-
ing companies organized and operating in a similar fashion will allevi-
ate America's trade deficit to a large extent. American trading
companies should be able to reach new markets with many American
goods already sold abroad and establish markets for American goods
that have heretofore been sold only in the United States. In doing so,
American trading companies presumably will create many new job op-
portunities, both within their own organizations and for their custom-
ers, who would be producing for the world market rather than for the
American market alone.
The only apparent alternatives to American development of pri-
vately held ETCs are to tolerate a continuing trade deficit or to rely on
massive government involvement in marketing American goods
abroad. These options appear infeasible, yet successful international
trade is a complex, expensive undertaking. The solution may lie in the
establishment of American ETCs similar to those of the United States
trading partners. In addition to the Japanese sogoshosha, the Koreans
have built similar organizations.323 China has begun organizing and
supporting state-run trading companies.324 In 1971, Brazil's Minister of
Finance helped found a trading company (Cobec), which was 30%
owned by the government's Banco di Brasil, with the remaining shares
primarily held by commercial banks from around the world.32 5 Not
surprisingly, Brazil's exports of manufactured goods rose 115% from
1976 to 1977.326
The passage of the Export Trading Company Act was a major leg-
islative step toward making America a powerful exporting nation. It is
now the responsibility of the government and of American business
leaders to develop the structures and methods necessary to realize the
Congressional hopes for export-based growth.
323 SoGosHosHA, supra note 3, at 67-72.
324 Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 26, 1982, at 6, coL 1-4.
325 SOGOSHOSHA, supra note 3, at 65-67.
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Table A-3. Major Activities of Subsidiaries of the Ten Leading Trading
Companies (March 31, 1973)*
ACTIVITY NUMBER PERCENT
Manufacturing 455 65.4




than extractive) 37 5.3
Total 696 100.0
* Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press from M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES 123 (1976)
Table A-4. Foreign Subsidiaries of the Ten Leading Trading Companies











Sundry goods 34 7.5
Pulp and paper 12 2.6
Other 24 5.3
Total 455 100.0
* Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press from M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES 123 (1976).
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Table A-5. Sales of the Ten General Trading Companies by Types of








































































* Reprintedbypermission of Westview Press from THE SOGO SHOSHA JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL
TRADING COMPANmS 29, by Alexander Young. Copyright © 1979 by Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado. "FY" stands for Fiscal Year.
Table A-6. Percentage Breakdowns of Annual Turnover of Ten Largest
General Trading Companies by Product and by Activity
(1974)*
Annual Turnover by Product




Mitsubishi 9% 32% 14% 13% 14% 18% 46%
Mitsui 9 34 16 15 12 14 44
Marubeni 20 27 20 13 10 11 44
C. Itoh 30 15 16 12 11 16 46
Sumitomo - 36 18 12 17 9 41
Nissho-Iwai 10 39 19 11 - 21 49
Tomen 22 23 21 14 8 6 35
Kanematsu 26 23 11 19 - 22 49
Ataka 17 36 12 - 15 20 40
Nichimen 19 25 13 20 11 12 56
* Reprinted with permission from THE JAPANESE ARE COMING: A MULTINATIONAL
INTERACTION OF FIRMS AND POLITICS 129, Copyright 1976, Ballinger Publishing Co.
** "Others" include the importation of timber trade and of crude oil, coal, and pulp
products.
Northwestern Journal of
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Table A-7. The Ten Largest General Trading Companies of Japan (1974)*
Annual Annual
Annual Turnover Profit
Turnover Number of Employee After





































































* Reprinted with permission from THE JAPANESE ARE COMING: A MULTINATIONAL INTERAC-
TION OF FIpms AND POLrICS 128, Copyright 1976, Ballinger Publishing Co.
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Table A-9. Profit Rates of Japanese General Trading Companies,
Manufacturers, and all Industries, 1962-1971*



























































a. Current profits before tax divided by total assets.
b. Current profits before tax divided by the sum of retained earnings reserved plus paid-in capi-
tal plus net profit after tax before dividends. Annual figure is an arithmetic average of semiannual
reports.
Reprintedbypernission of The Brookings Institution from Krause & Sekiguchi, Japan and the
WorldEconomy, in AsiA'S NEw GIANrT. How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 395 (H. Patrick
& H. Rosovsky ed. 1976), @ 1976 by the Brookings Institution.
Table A-10. The Six Largest Trading Companies (1973)*
TOTAL SALES NET PROFrr TOTAL NumEPR
NAME (V BILLION) (f BILUON) oF EmyLOYEES
Mitsubishi 612 31.2 10,001
Mitsui 574 28.9 10,948
Marubeni 361 30.4 8,039
C. Itoh 340 32.7 7,454
Sumitomo 312 17.3 5,564
Nissho-Iwai 297 6.8 7,096
* Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press from M. YosinNo, JAPAN'S MULTINA-
TIONAL ENEmwRPtsEs 28 (1976).


































Source: Y. SuzuKI, MONEY Am BANKINo IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 8. 0 1980 by Yale
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